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Analysis of the Proposed NYSE Corporate Governance and
Audit Committee Listing Requirements
Jillian M. Lutzy*
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the financial disasters of 2002, various regulatory
groups have proposed and begun to implement new regulations aimed
at enhancing the reliability of public financial reporting. Congress has
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("S.O."), which provides for the crea-
tion of a Public Accounting Oversight Board to be run under the um-
brella of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").'
Furthermore, the SEC has requested that the self-regulatory public
exchanges ("SROs") revise and tighten their listing requirements in
order to decrease the potential for future financial failures.
It is hypothesized that the audit committee is the best means of reg-
ulating public information flow and minimizing the risk of future fi-
nancial misstatements and fraud.2 Thus, among their proposed listing
requirement modifications the SROs (the Exchanges) have proposed
heightened and more specific requirements regarding audit commit-
tees' membership and responsibilities. Furthermore, through the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and general SEC oversight authority, the SEC
has promulgated several new or amended rules, which audit commit-
tees of issuer companies must also meet.
This paper will focus on and present a comparative analysis of the
current 1999 and the proposed 2002 New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") listing requirements for audit committees; it will also pre-
sent a brief analysis of the SEC and Sarbanes-Oxley Act rules that
implicate the audit committee and the resulting additional audit com-
* The Author is a recent graduate of The Harvard Law School. She is an associate at Jones
Day in New York pending bar admission in NY and NJ. She is a former auditor and a New York
CPA. Please note that "the views set forth herein are the personal views of the author and do
not necessarily reflect those of the law firm."
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, H.R. 3763, 10 [hereinafter S.O.].
2. Helen S. Scott, Corporate Accountability: The SEC, The Audit Committee Rules, and the
Marketplaces: Corporate Governance and the Future, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 549, 549-50 (2001). See
also, National Association of Corporate Directors ("NACD"), Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon
Commission on Audit Committees, A Practical Guide, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORPo-
RATE DIRECTORS AND THE CENTER FOR BOARD LEADERSHIP (2000).
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mittee requirements for NYSE listed companies. In addition, it will
examine if either, or both, foster the goals of enhanced reliability and
accuracy in financial reporting for public companies, and suggest addi-
tional relevant topics that the NYSE may want to address going
forward.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
Audit committees initially developed in large companies where the
size of the board required specialized committees.3 As early as 1939, a
report issued by the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") entitled
Independent Audits and Audit Procedures acknowledged that to en-
sure outside auditor independence corporate directors should nomi-
nate or select the independent auditors where practicable through a
special committee of the board composed of directors who were not
officers.4 Formal Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") en-
dorsement of the audit committee can be traced to a 1940 investiga-
tion of McKesson & Robbins.5  However, despite the SEC's
endorsement of such committees, between 1940 and the 1970s various
committees of Congress and business industries criticized the SEC for
its failure to require audit committees for all publicly held companies. 6
A series of business failures and mistakes in the 1960-70s brought the
audit committee back to the forefront of corporate governance pro-
posals. 7 In July 1967, the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
3. JEREMY BACON, AUDIT COMMITTEE: A BROADER MANDATE 6 (The Conference Board,
Research Report No. 914, 1988).
4. BARBARA APOSTOLOU & RAYMOND JEFFORDS, INTERNAL AUDIT BRIEFINGS - WORKING
WITH THE AUDIT COMMITTEE, (The Institute of Internal Auditors, 1977); INSTITUTE OF INTER-
NAL AUDITORS, INC., PROCEEDINGS, FIRST CONFERENCE ON AUDIT COMMITTEES OCTOBER 17-
19, 1977 FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA. (1978) [hereinafter Conference Audit Proceedings]; THE CA-
NADIAN INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS, AUDIT COMMITTEES, A RESEARCH STUDY
95 (1981) [hereinafter CICA].
5. APoSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 59; In the Matter of McKesson & Robbins, Inc.:
Summary Findings and Conclusions, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ACCOUNTING
SERIES (1940). See generally ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E., A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE 1935-1975 (Weybright & Talley 1975) (providing a detailed historical accounting of
the development of the NYSE prior to 1975).
6. APoSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 11. In 1968 Congress recommended requiring
such committees; in 1972 the SEC reiterated its call for the establishment of such committees,
and the NYSE "strongly recommended" the establishment of audit committees by listed compa-
nies. Id. Both groups suggested audit committees should consist of three to five outside direc-
tors. Id. While still not requiring audit committees, in 1975 the SEC again affirmatively
recommended that corporations establish permanent audit committees with outside directors.
Id.
7. Joseph W. Barr, Establishment and Operation of Audit Committees, in THE EMERGENCE OF
THE CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEE 9, 17(Practicing Law Institute 1978) (noting the explosive
situations with Penn Central, Equity Funding, and Franklin National Bank).
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countants ("AICPA") issued a statement recommending that publicly
owned companies appoint standing committees of outside directors
responsible for nominating the independent auditors, and other
outside advisors, and communicating with the independent auditors
whenever management could not satisfactorily resolve a question. 8
As the size of board of directors grew between the 1940s and the
1970s, many corporations realized that an audit committee could be a
viable mechanism for directors to meet their oversight responsibilities
in the internal control and financial reporting areas. 9 As early as 1973,
the NYSE white papers on financial reporting expressed the belief
that audit committees had become a necessity. 10 Finally, in January
1977, the NYSE adopted the listing requirement that domestic compa-
nies have audit committees as a prerequisite to listing on the ex-
change.11 This requirement left the determination of whom could
serve on the audit committee largely to the discretion of the com-
pany's board, with the board's decisions on eligibility governing in the
absence of strictly stated rules.12 For example, a director who was a
close relative of someone who would not qualify for audit committee
membership also would not normally qualify, but if there were valid
countervailing reasons to have the individual on the audit committee,
the board's decision to allow such an individual to serve would
govern.13
8. AICA Executive Committee Statement on Audit Committees of Board of Directors, 124 J.
AccT. 10 (1967); R.K. MAUTZ & F.L. NEUMANN, CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES: POLICIES
AND PRACTICES 9 (Ernst & Ernst 1977); John C. Biegler, Foreword to Louis BRAIOTrA, JR.,
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE DIRECTOR'S GUIDE: HOW TO SERVE EFFECTIVELY ON THE CORPORATE
AUDIT COMMITTEE 4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1981).
9. BACON, supra note 3, at 1; BRAIOIrA, supra note 10, at vii, 4-9; Conference Audit Proceed-
ings, supra note 4, at 43. Harold Williams, then Chairman of SEC noted "[t]he audit committee
is the most important development in corporate structure and governance in decades." Id.
10. Conference Audit Proceedings, supra note 4, at 67.
11. New York Stock Exchange, Statement of the New York Stock Exchange on Audit Com-
mittee Policy (Jan. 6, 1977) [hereinafter NYSE Statement]. NYSE added a requirement, ap-
proved by the SEC, that as of June 30, 1978, each domestic company listed on the NYSE must
establish and maintain "an audit committee comprised solely of directors independent of man-
agement and free from any relationship that, in the opinion of the board of directors, would
interfere with its exercise of independent judgment as a committee member." Id.
12. Id. at 10. Even a director who was partner, officer, or director of an organization with a
relationship with the listed company that was carried on in the ordinary course of business on an
arms-length basis could qualify for membership unless the board determined that such person
was not independent or the relationship would interfere with his exercise of independent judg-
ment as a committee member. See also MAUTZ & NEUMANN, supra note 8, at 18; Conference
Audit Proceedings, supra note 4, at 68.
13. NYSE Statement, supra note 11. This is the case unless the relative was an employee who
was not an executive officer. 1d.
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The audit committee has always stood at a crucial intersection be-
tween management, independent auditors, internal auditors, and the
board of directors. 14 Initial objectives behind establishing an audit
committee were to: help the board of directors meet their responsibil-
ities, provide better avenues of communication, enhance the outside
auditor's independent position, increase the reliability and objectivity
of financial reports, and to strengthen the role of outside directors.1 5
Along with the general demand for greater organizational account-
ability, the responsibilities of the audit committee have evolved
throughout the 20th century. 16 Now, both investors and directors gen-
erally consider the audit committees' oversight role to include: (1) re-
viewing and supervising the work of the organization's accounting and
internal auditing staff, and that of the independent auditors; (2) re-
viewing recommendations and discussions regarding the financial re-
porting process with the internal and external auditors, managements'
responses to financial reporting issues, and the annual and interim fi-
nancial reporting process; (3) obtaining assurances regarding the time-
liness and accuracy of all reports filed with the regulatory authorities,
the control and risk environments of the company, and the adequacy
of the accounting and control systems in place.17
III. ExiSTING NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDIT
COMMITTEE LISTING REQUIREMENTS
Pending SEC approval of and transition to the NYSE August 1,
2002 proposed Corporate Governance listing requirements, the audit
committee listing requirements found in § 303 of the New York Stock
Exchange Listed Company Manual will continue to govern the ex-
change.18 Under § 303 each listed company must have a qualified au-
dit committee that meets the requirements delineated below.
14. MAUTZ & NEUMANN, supra note 8, at 115 (noting that the audit committee is viewed as a
bridge between the board of directors and the auditors); Conference Audit Proceedings, supra
note 4, at 87; BRAIOTIrA, supra note 10, at 5-8.
15. BRAIOTrA, supra note 10, at 5-8 (noting that the individual investor is of paramount im-
portance to the nation's capital markets and the audit committee provides an additional avenue
of accountability to external users of the financial statements).
16. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 33 (2002). Case law has developed to delineate the duties of
the board of directors and the audit committee.
17. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 37; RICHARD M. STEINBERG & CATHERINE L.
BROMILOW, AUDIT COMMITrEE EFFECTIVENESS - WHAT WORKS BEST, 1 (Pricewaterhouse
Coopers, 2d ed. 2000).
18. NYSE LISTING STAND. § 303 (1999) [hereinafter NYSE 1999 Standards, and the applica-
ble section number]. This section deals with Corporate Responsibility.
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A. Independence
Existing 1999 NYSE listing standards require independence for au-
dit committee members only.19 Essentially, members must be free
from any relationship that would interfere with the exercise of unbi-
ased judgment as a committee member. Independence is required in
both mental attitude and in appearance, and thus members are pre-
cluded from having any relationship with the company that might in-
terfere with the exercise of a director's independence from
management and from the company.20
Section 303.01(B)(3) of the New York Stock Exchange Listed Com-
pany Manual includes more specific restrictions on audit committee
membership. First, any director who is an employee of the listed com-
pany or its affiliate may not serve on the audit committee until three
years after termination of employment or the affiliate relationship. 21
Additionally, a director whose immediate family member is an execu-
tive officer of the listed company or an affiliate cannot serve on the
audit committee until three years following the termination of such
employment or affiliation relationship. 22 A director who is not con-
sidered independent due to the three year restrictions, may be ap-
pointed to the audit committee if the company's board of directors
determines in its business judgment that membership on the commit-
tee by that director is in the best interests of the company and its
shareholders. 23
Next, a director who is a partner, controlling shareholder, or execu-
tive officer of an organization that has a relationship with the com-
pany, or who has a direct business relationship with the company may
not serve on the audit committee unless the board of directors deter-
mines that such relationship does not interfere with the director's ex-
ercise of independent judgment.24 Finally, a director who is part of an
inter-locking directorate and is employed as an executive of another
19. Id. § 303.01(B)(2)(a). Relationship laid out as defined in the § 303.01 and § 303.02
prohibitions.
20. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 27; NYSE 1999 Standards, supra note 18,
§ 303.01(B)(2)(a).
21. NYSE 1999 Standards, supra note 18, § 303.01(B)(3). These requirements apply to each
member of the audit committee. Id.
22. Id. § 303.01(B)(3)(d). "Immediate Family" as defined in § 303.02.
23. Id. § 303.02(D) (note: only one such director shall be approved).
24. Id. § 303.01(B)(3)(b). In using its business judgment to make such a determination the
board should consider among all factors: the materiality of the relationship to the company, to
the director, and to the organization the director is affiliate with. Id. Business relationship can
include among others commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal, and accounting relation-
ships. Id. Only in extreme cases will a mere employee/employer relationship with such an or-
ganization prohibit audit committee serviced. Id.
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corporation, for which an executive of the listed company serves on
the compensation committee, may not serve on the listed company's
audit committee. 25 If any of the independence requirements above
are waived, the relationship at issue must be disclosed in the com-
pany's proxy statement. 26 A director may serve without the board's
determination on the audit committee at any time more than three
years after the termination of any employment or business relation-
ships prohibited by the requirements. 27 Written confirmation regard-
ing each director's independence must be provided to the NYSE at
initial listing, when any changes are made to the audit committee, or
at a minimum yearly. 28
B. Composition
Under the 1999 NYSE listing requirements, the audit committee
must meet certain composition/expertise requirements. The commit-
tee must have a minimum of three directors that are each independent
from the company.29 Additionally, each member must be financially
literate or become literate within a reasonable time after appointment
to the committee; and at least one member of the audit committee
must have accounting or related financial management expertise. 30
Furthermore, each listed company must provide written affirmation
regarding the financial literacy of the audit committee members, and
25. Id. § 303.01(B)(3)(c).
26. Id. § 303.02 (stating that the company must "disclose in the next annual proxy statement
subsequent to such determination, the nature of the relationship and the reasons for the determi-
nation"); STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 37.
27. NYSE 1999 Standards, supra note 18, § 303.01(B)(3)(b) (stating "(1)[T] he relationship
between the organization with which the director is affiliated and the company, (2) the relation-
ship between the director and his or her partnership status, shareholder interest or executive
officer position, or (3) the direct business relationship between the director and the company.").
28. Id. § 303.02(C)(4). Note: the language of § 303.02 does not specify who within the com-
pany is responsible for providing such written affirmations. This ambiguity also applies to the
written affirmation requirements for the board of director independence determinations and the
annual review and reassessment of the adequacy of the audit committee charter. Note that this
requirement is also delineated in SEC Release No. 34-42266, Audit Committee Disclosure, Ex-
change Act Release No. 42266, 64 Fed. Reg. 73389 (Dec. 22, 1999), available at http:www.sec.gov/
rules/final/33-8220.htm. [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-42266], which requires proxy disclosure
regarding the audit committee, its composition, and the determination of member's
independence.
29. NYSE 1999 Standards, supra note 18, § 301.01(B)(2)(a) (stating "[E]ach audit committee
shall consist of at least three directors, all of whom have no relationship to the company that
may interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and the company
('Independency').").
30. Id. § 301.01(B)(2)(b) (stating "Financially literate" as interpreted and defined by the
board of directors in its business judgment); NYSE 1999 Standards, supra note 18,
§ 301.01(B)(2)(c) (stating "Financial management expertise" as interpreted by the board of di-
rectors in its business judgment).
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the determination that at least one member has accounting or related
financial management expertise to the NYSE at initial listing, when
any changes are made to the audit committee, or at a minimum
yearly.3'
C. Written Charter
An audit committee is formed by resolution of a company's board
of directors or by amending the company's bylaws.32 After formation,
the board of directors must adopt and approve a formal written char-
ter for the audit committee, which the company must annually review,
reassess, and provide written confirmation to the NYSE regarding the
reassessment and adequacy. 33 Although charter specified duties and
responsibilities should not be so narrow that special inquires and in-
vestigations cannot be incorporated, the 1999 NYSE listing require-
ments direct the board of directors to specify the scope of the audit
committee's responsibilities and its manner of carrying out those re-
sponsibilities. The requirements include the committee's structure,
processes, and membership requirements. 34
The charter must specify the following: (1) the scope of the commit-
tee's responsibilities and how it intends to carry out those responsibili-
ties, which include defining the committee's structure, processes, and
membership requirements; (2) a statement that the outside auditor is
ultimately accountable to the board of directors and the audit commit-
tee and that both have ultimate authority and responsibility to select,
evaluate, and if appropriate replace the external auditor; (3) a state-
ment that the audit committee is responsible for ensuring that the
outside auditor periodically submits to it a formal written statement
delineating all relationships between the auditor and the company,
and discussing with the outside auditor any disclosed relationship or
services that may impact the objectivity and independence of the
outside auditor, and recommending the board take appropriate action
in response to the outside auditor's report in order to satisfy itself
regarding the outside auditor's independence. 35
31. Id. § 303.02(C)(1)-(4). See supra text accompanying note 29.
32. BRAIOTrA, supra note 10, at 4.
33. NYSE 1999 Standards, supra note 18, § 303.02(C); see discussion supra note 29.
34. NYSE 1999 Standards, supra note 18, § 303.01B(1)(a).
35. Id. § 303.01(B)(1)(a)-(c). The board and audit committee also have discretion to nomi-
nate the outside auditor, but the nominations may be proposed for shareholder approval in a
proxy statement. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 24.
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D. Fees
The 1999 NYSE listing requirements make no mention of specific
restrictions on audit committee fees.
E. Rotation
The 1999 NYSE rotation requirements make no specific mention of
rotation of the audit committee members, or of the independent audi-
tor. However, under their joint responsibility for evaluating and ap-
proving the outside auditor and responsibilities under state corporate
law, the audit committee and board of directors are responsible for
overseeing that any external auditor rotation requirements, or other
specific requirements, imposed by state corporate or federal securities
law are met.36
IV. PROPOSED NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDIT
COMMITTEE LISTING REQUIREMENTS
In response to the recent wave of corporate scandals and fraud, the
NYSE has proposed substantial changes to its listing requirements.
The proposed changes include expanded director and audit committee
independence requirements. The NYSE submitted the proposed list-
ing requirements approved by its board of directors to the SEC on
August 16, 2002. The proposals were open to public comment through
October 2002 are now subject to review and approval by the SEC.
Once approved, the proposed additions and modifications will be
codified in the new § 303A of the New York Stock Exchange Listed
Company Manual. The new section will include both rules that must
be implemented and suggested practices the Exchange believes should
be followed.
The modified requirements will apply to all companies listing com-
mon stock, and to business organizations in non-corporate forms such
as limited partnerships, business trusts, and Real Estate Investment
Trusts ("REITS"). 37 Some of the new requirements will be effective
36. BACON, supra note 3, at 9. Note that the SEC requires lead and concurring partner
rotation at least once every five years. See also Strengthening the Commission's Requirements
Regarding Auditor Independence, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8183, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb.
5, 2003) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249 & 274) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 33-
8183].
37. Corporate Governance Rules Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE
Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee As Approved by the NYSE Board
of Directors Aug. 1, 2002, at 3, available at http:/www.nyse.con/pdfscorp-gov.prob.pdf (sub-
sequently accepted and approved by the NYSE Board of Directors and codified at § 303A)
[hereinafter NYSE 2002 Standards]. As in the past, the Exchange will not apply the standards to
passive business organization in the form of trusts, to derivative or special purpose securities.
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within six months of SEC approval, and others will be implemented
over a twenty-four month period. 38 As in past practices, there are
likely to be special considerations and exceptions given to foreign
listed companies regarding compliance with these new standards.39
The proposed § 303A includes the requirements applicable to audit
committees discussed below. The requirements in this section should
also be compared to the enacted Sarbanes-Oxley requirements dis-
cussed in Section V. of this paper. Note that both sets of requirements
must be met by audit committee members on the board of a company
listed on any of the major exchanges.
A. Independence
First, perhaps the most significant proposed change to the NYSE
listing requirements is the tightening of the definition of "independent
director," combined with the application of the new definition to the
entire board rather than just the audit committee. In addition to
maintaining the requirement that each listed company have an audit
committee composed of at least three independent directors, pro-
posed § 303A requires that listed companies have a majority of inde-
pendent directors on their full board of directors.40 This requirement
is meant to increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the pos-
sibility of damaging conflicts of interest.41
Additionally, the proposed standards add several general qualifica-
tions for director independence. First, no director will qualify as inde-
pendent unless the board affirmatively determines that the director
has no material relationship with the listed company directly or as a
partner, shareholder, or director or officer of an organization that has
a relationship with the listed company; such determinations must be
disclosed in the company's annual proxy statement.42 When making
38. Id. § 303A & cmts., at 3. For example, within six months the following will be required
regarding the audit committee: increased authority and responsibility of the committee through
adoption of a charter meeting the new requirements. However, those companies that do not
already have majority independent boards will have twenty-four months to recruit and place
qualified directors to comply with the new standards.
39. See supra section V.D. for a discussion of the special consideration and exceptions given
to foreign listed companies under S.O., supra note 1, at § 301 SEC Releases.
40. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A1 & cmts., at 5. There will be an exception to
this requirement for closely-held companies but the exchange expects this exception to affect
only a small percentage of its listed companies. Id.
41. Id. § 303A1.
42. Id. § 303A2. The proposal specifies that material relationships can include but are not
limited to commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable, and familial
relationships. Id. See also, Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-8220 [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,902, at 87,402
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such determinations, significant stock ownership, while a factor to be
considered, is not alone considered a bar to a determination of inde-
pendence; however, one business relationship with the listed company
could independently render a director non-independent if the rela-
tionship is determined by the board to be material to the director or
his business. 43 With respect to the disclosure of such determinations,
a company may adopt and disclose categorical standards to use in
making independence determinations. 44 If a company chooses to use
this method of disclosure, only the determination of independence for
directors who do not meet the categorical standards and the basis for
such determination, must be specifically disclosed.45
Second, § 303A2(b) of the proposed requirements expands the
cooling-off period from certain prohibited relationships from three to
five years. A former employee of the company, a director who has
been affiliated with or employed by a present or former auditor of the
company or an affiliate, or a director who has been part of an inter-
locking directorate - in which an executive officer of the listed com-
pany serves on the compensation committee of another company that
concurrently employs the director, will not be independent until five
years after the termination of the employment, affiliation, auditing, or
interlocking relationship.46 Directors with immediate family members
in any of the above categories are likewise subject to a five-year cool-
ing off period.47
Finally, in order to utilize the new requirements to implement what
is hoped to be a more effective check over management activities and
policies, the proposed listing requirements also require non-manage-
ment directors to meet at regularly scheduled meetings without
management. 48
(Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm [hereinafter SEC Release
No. 33-8220].
43. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 39, § 303A2(a) & cmts., at 5.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 303Al(b)(i) - (iii) (stating that the definition of "former employee" excludes an
interim Chairman or CEO).
47. Id. § 303Al(b)(iv) & cmts., at 6. "Immediate family" as defined in current § 303.02 in-
cludes a spouse, parent, child, sibling, 1st generation in-laws, and anyone else who is a non-
employee and shares the directors' home. Id. § 303.02. Employment of a family member in a
non-officer position does not preclude a board from determining independence. Id. § 301. If a
director dies or becomes incapacitated his immediate family members, if otherwise independent,
will be deemed immediately independent. Id.
48. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A3 & cmt., at 6 (stating "Non-management"
includes those directors who are not company officers, and those who are not independent by
virtue of a material relationship, former status or family membership).
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B. Composition
The proposed listing requirements incorporate the 1999 pre-existing
composition requirements. Thus, listed companies must continue to
have an audit committee composed of at least three independent di-
rectors; each member is required to be or become financially literate
within a reasonable time of committee appointment; and each audit
committee must have at least one member with accounting or related
financial management expertise.49 These requirements have been in-
corporated due to the belief that knowledgeable audit committee
members will be more likely to recognize estimates and susceptibility
to manipulation and give them the necessary scrutiny.50
Draft versions of the NYSE listing proposals recommended that the
audit committee chair be required to have accounting or financial re-
lated expertise. However this requirement was dropped in light of the
congressional adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,51 particu-
larly § 301.52 In addition, although the exchange considered address-
ing the conflict between a controlling shareholder and public
shareholder by recommending that an affiliate of a twenty-percent, or
greater, shareholder may only be a non-voting member of the audit
committee, this provision was not proposed in light of the Sarbanes-
Oxley provision that disqualifies affiliated persons from any service on
an audit committee. 53 The NYSE has reserved the right to further
revise its listing requirements in the future if it does not think the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act adequately addresses these issues once it is fully
implemented.
C. Written Charter
While maintaining most of the responsibilities included in the 1999
listing requirements, the proposed listing requirements significantly
increase the responsibility and autonomy of the audit committee by
49. Id. § 303A6 & cmt., at 9 (stating "financially literate" and "financial management exper-
tise" as interpreted by the company's board in its business judgment). See supra Section V.A. of
this paper for a discussion regarding additional "audit committee financial expert" requirements
promulgated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
50. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17.
51. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2003) (thereinafter codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201
(2003)).
52. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A6 & cmts., at 9. See infra Section V. of this
paper for a discussion of the expertise requirements promulgated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
See also, Disclosure Required By §§ 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-8177, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/33-8177.htm (regarding "audit committee financial experts") [hereinafter SEC Release No.
33-8177].
53. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A6 & cmts., at 9.
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granting it the sole authority to hire and fire independent external au-
ditors, and to approve all significant non-audit relationships with inde-
pendent auditors.54 While the audit committee cannot delegate
responsibility for this task to management or the board of directors, it
is not precluded from obtaining management input regarding the in-
dependent auditor.55
Under § 303A7, the requirement that each listed company have a
written charter for its audit committee is retained, and the noted list of
specific items that the charter must include is expanded. Section
303A7 specifies that the written charter must address the committees'
purposes, duties and responsibilities, and its required annual perform-
ance evaluation of itself.56
1. Purpose
Section 303A7 of the proposed listing requirements specifies that
the audit committee's written purpose must at minimum be to:
(A) assist board oversight of (1) the integrity of the financial state-
ments, (2) the company's compliance with legal and regulatory re-
quirements, (3) the independent auditor's qualifications and
independence, and (4) the performance of the company's internal
audit function and independent auditors; and (B) prepare the report
that SEC rules require to be included in the company's annual
proxy statement. 57
2. Duties and Responsibilities
Section 303A7 also specifies that the written charter must include at
minimum the following ten duties and responsibilities of the audit
committee. 58 First, sole responsibility for the retention and termina-
tion of the company's independent auditors.59 Second, performance
of an annual review of the independent auditor and its report which
must cover: the firm's internal quality-control procedures; any mate-
rial issues raised by the auditor's most recent internal-quality control
or peer review of the firm, or by an inquiry or investigation by govern-
mental or other authorities within the preceding five years relating to
one or more independent audits carried out by the auditing firm, and
54. Id. § 303A7(a).
55. Id. § 303A7(a) & cmts., at 10.
56. Id. § 303A7. Note that § 303A7(c) also requires each listed company to have an internal
audit function. Id.
57. Id. § 303A7(b)(i)(A-B).
58. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(A)-(J). Note that (A)-(J) reference
correspondingly to the first through tenth proposed duties and responsibilities.
59. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(A); STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 24-25 (shareholders
ratify the selection of the external auditor in many companies).
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all steps taken to deal with any issues; and all relationships between
the independent auditing firm and the listed company.60 This annual
review should include an evaluation of the lead independent audit
partner and verification of regular rotation of the lead partner as re-
quired by law; the audit committee should further consider whether
there should be regular rotation of the audit firm itself.61 The audit
committee should present its conclusions from this review to the full
board.
Third, discuss the yearly audited and quarterly financial statements
with management and the independent auditor, including the com-
pany's disclosure under the Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations ("MD&A"). Fourth,
engage in regular discussions about any earnings press releases and
financial information and earnings guidance provided to analysts and
rating agencies. Fifth, seek and obtain advice and assistance as appro-
priate from outside advisors including legal and accounting advisors,
without seeking board approval. Sixth, discuss and review in a general
manner the company policies and guidelines, which govern the pro-
cess by which risk assessment and management, are handled. Sev-
enth, periodically meet separately with management, internal
auditors, and independent auditors. Eighth, review with the indepen-
dent auditor any audit problems and managements' response to such
problems. Ninth, set and review hiring policies for current and former
employees of the independent audit firm. Tenth, report regularly to
the board of directors.62
While most of these proposed duties and responsibilities are gener-
ally consistent with those delineated in the 1999 listing requirements
and those performed in current practice, this will be the first time each
is required to be laid out in the audit committee's formal charter and
performed annually with more specificity. Each will be analyzed in
detail in Section VI.C. of this paper.
3. Annual Performance Evaluation
Section 303A7 also requires that the audit committee perform an
annual performance evaluation of itself. This type of review is some-
60. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(B) & cmts., at 11. See also, the re-
quirements of SEC Release No. 34-42266 supra note 28, requiring certain charter duties by the
audit committee of issuer companies.
61. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(B), at 11.
62. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(C-J). Corresponding to the third through the tenth required duties and
responsibilities.
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thing each company should have previously been doing each year. 63
However, there is no specific guidance in the listing requirements as
to what this review should incorporate. Industry reports suggest that
this type of annual performance review should be strengthened such
that the audit committee can be required to prepare and present a
formal evaluation of its own activities to the board; including a synop-
sis of the level of involvement and performance by each member. 64
Possible topics such a review might include are: (1) a comparison of
the committee's activities versus the charter; (2) a comparison of the
committee's activities verses formal industry recommendations and
rules; and (3) a comparison against best practices as provided in indus-
try guidelines. 65 However, as discussed in Section VII.B. of this pa-
per, audit committees might be reluctant to document this type of
information due to possible liability implications.
D. Fees
The proposed listing requirements specify that normal directors'
fees must be the audit committee members' only form of compensa-
tion from the company.66 Normal fees generally include reasonable
additional compensation for extra time spent on committee work.67
Furthermore, an otherwise independent director's receipt of a pension
or other deferred compensation for prior services will not preclude
that director from satisfying the fee limitation.68
E. Rotation
The audit committee's annual review should include ensuring regu-
lar rotation of the lead independent auditor partners, as required by
corporate law and SEC rules.69 However, the proposed listing re-
quirements do not contain any new specific requirements regarding
rotation of the independent auditor, or of the audit committee
members.
63. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 42 (noting that according to best practices an
audit committee should regularly evaluation its own performance).
64. Id. (noting that committee member's self-assessment reviews could be beneficial).
65. Id.
66. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A6, at 9.
67. Id. § 303A6 & cmts., at 9.
68. Id.
69. BACON, supra note 3, at 9; SEC Release No. 33-8183 supra note 36.
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V. SEC AND SARBANES-OXLEY RULES THAT DIRECTLY
IMPLICATE NYSE LISTING REQUIREMENTS FOR
AUDIT COMMITTEES
The SEC's recent development of a Public Oversight Board and the
legislation adopted through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directly implicate
many of the same issues as the NYSE proposed listing requirements.
While this paper focuses on the NYSE listing requirements for audit
committees, it is necessary to note the interaction and distinctions
among the New York Stock Exchange Rules and the applicable SEC
Rules in order to provide a complete and realistic picture of the devel-
oping landscape for audit committees.70 In addition to meeting its in-
dividual listing requirements for audit committees, the NYSE will be
prohibited from listing any security of an issuer that is not in compli-
ance with certain SEC and Sarbanes-Oxley rules and amendments.
Exchange Act Rule 1OA-3 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301 and
407 will apply to issuers of any nationally listed securities not just vot-
ing securities.71
A. Independence
Under Sarbanes-Oxley § 301 each member of the audit committee
of the issuer must be independent according to specified criteria. The
final rule requires that audit committee members may not: (1) accept
directly or indirectly any consulting advisory or other compensatory
fee from the issuer company or its subsidiaries (other than board and
committee service fees); or (2) be an affiliated person of the company
or any subsidiary of the company. 72 The prohibition on acceptance of
compensatory fees also precludes audit committee service if an imme-
diate family member earns such fees.73 Preclusion does not apply to a
director who holds a non-management position, similar to that of a
limited partner in the entity, and who has no active role in providing
70. Note that while many additional provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act overlap with audit
committee requirements, these were the most currently applicable; a full analysis of the provi-
sions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is outside the scope of this paper.
71. S.O., supra note 1, at § 301; see also SEC Release No. 33-8220, supra note 42 (for specifics
and discussion regarding the implementation); Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz, Sarbanes-Oxley Update: SEC Adopts Final Rules Relating to Audit Committees of Listed
Companies at 3 (Apr. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Wachtell Memorandum] available at http://
www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/wlrkO4llO3.PDF. Note that under this rule if a listed com-
pany does not establish an audit committee, its entire board will be considered the committee for
purposes of application of these rules such that if the board does not meet the included rules the
company may be de-listed or subject to alternative forms of punishment. SEC Release No. 34-
42266, supra note 28.
72. Wachtell Memorandum, supra note 71, at 3.
73. Id.
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services to the company; or to any non-financial commercial relation-
ships between the issuer company and the entity with which a director
has a prohibited relationship. 74 In contrast to the stricter Self-Regula-
tory Organization requirements, the independence rules in this section
apply to current relationships only; like the NYSE requirement, the
fee limitation does not cover fixed amounts of compensation under a
retirement plan for prior service.75
With respect to the definitions of "affiliated person" for the purpose
of this rule, an affiliate is "a person that directly, or indirectly through
one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under
common control with," the other person.76 "Controlled" is inter-
preted as having direct or indirect power to direct management and
policies of the company. S.O. § 301 creates a safe-harbor from dis-
qualification for persons who are not executive officers and do not
beneficially own more than 10% of any voting class of securities. 77
Finally, special exceptions and provisions are provided for directors
who sit on the board of both a listed company and its affiliate but
otherwise meet the independence standards, but for dual holding
companies. 78
B. Responsibilities of Audit Committee Members
1. Selection and Oversight of the Independent Auditor
Under S.O. § 301 and SEC Release No. 33-8220, the audit commit-
tee of each listed company must be directly responsible for the selec-
tion of its independent auditor.
The audit committee of each issuer must be directly responsible for
the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the
work of any registered public accounting firm engaged for the pur-
pose of preparing or issuing an audit report or performing other
audit, review or attest services for the issuer, and each such regis-
tered public accounting firm must report directly to the audit
committee. 79
The rule furthermore provides that the audit committee of a parent
company may pre-approve the auditor and services for any consoli-
dated subsidiaries.8 0 All listed companies must comply with these re-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing the SEC 1934 Act definition for "affiliate").
77. S.O., supra note 1, § 301 (see rules for specifics).
78. Wachtell Memorandum, supra note 71; S.O., supra note 1, § 301 (see rules for specifics).
79. S.O., supra note 1, § 301.
80. Wachtell Memorandum, supra note 71.
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quirements by the first shareholder meeting after January 15, 2004, or
by October 31, 2004.81
2. Duties and Responsibilities over Management of
Accounting Matters
Under S.O. § 301 "[e] ach audit committee must establish proce-
dures for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints regarding
accounting, internal accounting controls, or other auditing matters, in-
cluding procedures for the confidential, anonymous submission by
employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable account-
ing or auditing matters. '8 2 Like the NYSE listing requirements in this
area, the rules here do not delineate or require specific procedures to
be followed. Audit committees are thus left with the flexibility to de-
velop procedures that work best for their company.83
C. Autonomy to Engage Advisors and Request Proper
Funding for the Committee
Under S.O. § 301 "[e] ach audit committee must have the authority
to engage independent counsel and other advisors, as it determines
necessary to carry out its duties; and [e]ach issuer must provide appro-
priate funding for the audit committee." 4 This autonomy to engage
independent advisors is similar to that granted in the proposed listing
requirements.
D. Exemptions are Provided for Foreign Private Issuers
The rules promulgated under S.O. § 301 provide exemptions for
foreign private issuers that include allowing: (1) a non-executive em-
ployee on the audit committee where required by home company reg-
ulation or prior collective bargaining agreements; (2) one
representative - who is not an executive officer and has not received
other compensation from the listed company - of a controlling share-
holder as a non-voting member of the audit committee; (3) a foreign
governmental representative to be a member of the audit committee
as long as no other compensation is earned by the representative from
the company; and (4) the use of statutory auditors and board of audi-
81. Id. at 3.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. S.O., supra note 1, § 301.
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tors to perform the auditor oversight function when specified condi-
tions are met.85
E. Required Disclosures Regarding the Audit Committee
Under the new rules, issuers will have to disclose the following:
whether they have an audit committee and if so the names of the
members and if applicable which exception to the rule they are reply-
ing on.86 However, since the NYSE requires that each listed company
have an audit committee, with no similar exception, this disclosure is
somewhat irrelevant in the context of this paper.
F. Composition - Definition of and Requirements for the
"Audit Committee Financial Expert"
The SEC adopted rules implementing Sarbanes-Oxley § 407 that
will require public companies to disclose information about "audit
committee financial experts. ' 87 This disclosure is required in the an-
nual reports, and a company may at its discretion also include it in
other proxy or information statements.8 8 Under SEC Release No. 33-
8177 a company subject to the 1934 Act will be required to annually
disclose if it has at least one "audit committee financial expert" on its'
committee, the name of the financial expert, and whether the expert is
independent from management; alternatively, a company that does
not have a "audit committee financial expert" will have to say why it
does not.8 9
The adopted rules define "audit committee financial expert" to
mean:
[A] person who has the following attributes: (1) an understanding of
financial statements and generally accepted accounting principles;
(2) an ability to assess the general application of such principles in
connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves;
(3) experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial
85. Id.; Wachtell Memorandum, supra note 71, at 3. Note that despite these exceptions, the
SEC requires foreign listed companies to disclose in their annual reports the name of the audit
committee "financial expert" and if that person meets the independence standards as defined by
the applicable SRO listing standards.
86. S.O., supra note 1, § 301; Wachtell Memorandum, supra note 71, at 3.
87. S.O., supra note 1, § 406; SEC Release No. 33-8177, supra note 52; Disclosure Required by
Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Correction, Exchange Act Amendment
Release No. 33-8177A (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http.//www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177a.htm
[hereinafter SEC Release No. 33-8177A].
88. S.O., supra note 1, § 406; SEC Release No. 33-8177, supra note 52: SEC Release No. 33-
8177A, supra note 87.
89. S.O., supra note 1, § 406; SEC Release No. 33-8177, supra note 52; SEC Release No. 33-
8177A, supra note 87.
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statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of ac-
counting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and
complexity of issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by
the registrant's financial statements, or experience actively supervis-
ing one or more persons engaged in such activities; (4) an under-
standing of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting;
and (5) an understanding of audit committee functions. 90
The rules specify that an individual can acquire the required attrib-
utes through a variety of means including: (1) background education
combined with past experience as a principal financial or accounting
officer, controller, public accountant or auditor, or combined exper-
iences in at least two other positions that involve similar functions; (2)
experience actively supervising one of the above listed types of per-
sons, or overseeing or assessing companies or public accountants in
the preparation of auditing of financial statements; or (3) other similar
relevant experience. 91
The commentary to the § 407 rule also provides guidance to compa-
nies when determining if an audit committee member qualifies as an
"audit committee financial expert"; it lists twelve specific factors for
companies to consider.92 However, despite application of some or all
of these factors, it is important to note that to qualify, a director must
possess all of the above listed attributes. Also note that under this
rule, while an expert does not necessarily need personal experience in
applying GAAP, the rules specify that she or he must have the ac-
quired ability to asses the application of these principals. 93
The rule also provides a safe-harbor for liability in specifically not-
ing that the title "audit committee financial expert" will not make an
individual an expert for any other purpose and does not impose
greater liability on such individual than that imposed on other mem-
bers of the audit committee.94 This safe harbor is important to note in
the current debate over the potential increased liability for audit com-
mittee members resulting from the proposed NYSE listing
requirements.
90. S.O., supra note 1, § 406; SEC Release No. 33-8177, supra note 52; SEC Release No. 33-
8177A, supra note 87.
91. S.O., supra note 1, § 406; SEC Release No. 33-8177, supra note 52; SEC Release No. 33-
8177A, supra note 87; Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules on Provisions of Sarbanes Oxley
Act, 2003-6 (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-6.htm [hereinafter
SEC Press Release 2003-6].
92. S.O., supra note 1, § 406; SEC Release No. 33-8177, supra note 52; SEC Release No. 33-
8177A, supra note 87; SEC Press Release 2003-6, supra note 91.
93. S.O., supra note 1, § 406; SEC Release No. 33-8177, supra note 52; SEC Release No. 33-
8177A, supra note 87; SEC Press Release 2003-6, supra note 91.
94. S.O., supra note 1, § 406; SEC Release No. 33-8177, supra note 52; SEC Release No. 33-
8177A, supra note 87; SEC Press Release 2003-6, supra note 91.
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VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVE 1999 AND
PROPOSED 2002 NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AUDIT
COMMITTEE LISTING REQUIREMENTS
A driving force behind the newly proposed NYSE listing require-
ments is the goal of enhancing the accountability, integrity and trans-
parency of listed companies. The following section contains an
analysis of the differences between the new and proposed listing re-
quirements, combined with critical commentary regarding if the pro-
posed listing requirements actually require anything more than that
which is currently practiced by a majority of listed companies. 95 Fi-
nally, this section also includes several suggestions of alternative
methods or practices, which are either implicated by the new listing
requirements, or are relevant industry concerns but are not mentioned
in proposed listing requirements. 96
A. Independence
1. Majority Independent Board of Directors
It appears that the proposed requirement that all listed companies
must have a majority of independent directors is significant.97 How-
ever, according to industry studies and reports, many boards already
have a majority of independent directors.98 For example, according to
a 1988 survey by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, 71%
of member companies responded that their boards already had a ma-
jority of independent directors. 99 Furthermore, several of the compa-
nies whose recent defaults in part triggered the current overhaul of
the listing standards also had boards that had a majority of indepen-
95. This section will also include relevant commentary and notations when the SEC adopted
Sarbanes-Oxley rules, discussed supra at Section V., are directly implicated.
96. See commentary to the proposed listing requirement cited in each specifically mentioned
section below for example of how the suggested additional topics are implicated.
97. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A1.
98. See BACON, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that a 1987 survey showed high compliance with
independence guidelines even among non-exchange companies); Donald C. Langevoort, The
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Indepen-
dence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 798 (Apr. 2001) (noting that although widely fol-
lowed as a guideline for audit committee membership, independence is a subjective concept).
99. Report from the N.Y.S.E. Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee,
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-govreport.pdf, A-9 (June 6, 2002) (note that this or-
ganization's membership includes over 3,800 individuals whose professional responsibilities are
focused on corporate governance and board-related matters) [hereinafter NYSE Report]; but see
BACON, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that a 1978 survey showed that 90% of respondents did not
consider their company to have independence problems).
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dent members.100 Thus, perhaps the change in the definition of inde-
pendence in the proposed listing requirements will prove more
significant than the majority independence requirement.
Whether this new requirement will in fact help reach the Ex-
change's goals of increasing accountability, integrity, and transparency
will in part depend on how companies approach the requirement. If
many companies have to hire new independent directors to replace or
add to their current board, and thus significantly alter their board
composition, this could have a significant impact on the state of corpo-
rate governance. As a positive sign, some such companies seem to be
taking the requirement seriously even before the approval of the pro-
posal. For example, General Motors has already announced its inten-
tions to revise its board composition in order to achieve majority
independence. Yet, it will be interesting to see how many listed com-
panies simply try and "fit" their old directors into the new indepen-
dence definitions using the boards' "business judgment" and wisely
worded categorical standards.
2. Definition of Independence
a. Time Frame for Cooling-Off from Prohibited Relationships
Although the proposed definition of independence seems tighter
than the former, the ultimate determination remains with the business
judgment of the board of directors, and the definition remains broad
enough for the relevant facts and circumstances of each particular sit-
uation to be taken into account. 10 1 The concrete difference between
the two sets of listing requirements is the switch from a three-year to a
five-year cooling-off period for the defined relationships.
Although statistically it makes sense that a longer time frame
should work to catch more forbidden relationships, it is not evident
any time frame will ever catch all pre-existing relationships. For ex-
ample, if a former employee of the company is appointed to serve on
the audit committee after the five-year cooling off period he will not
necessarily have fewer loyalties than someone who only waits three
100. E.g. Enron; WorldCom - both met the official requirements for the NYSE 1999 listing
requirements for audit committee membership and seemed to have a majority of independent
directors. But see, James S. Lubin, Inside, Outside Enron, Audit Panel Is Scrutinized, Links to
Company Of Certain Members Are Called Too Cozy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at CI (noting the
audit committee made up of prominent executives looks well qualified but corporate gover-
nances experts doubt they were all truly independent).
101. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A1 & § 303A2 ("unless the board affirma-
tively determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company...").
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years.102 Yet, the alternative of never allowing an individual who for-
merly had one of the relationships defined in § 303A2 to serve on the
board of the company also seems excessive. Perhaps using a longer
time frame such as ten years would significantly lower the risk of for-
mer employees, auditors, or affiliates, having relevant loyalties to the
board, management, or auditors at the time they are appointed to the
audit committee.
b. Substance of Independence Definition
While some commentators to the proposed requirements agree that
leaving defined types of situations that require a finding of non-inde-
pendence is better than specifying exact specialized relationships,
others are against this type of approach to regulation; this debate
comes down to a rules verses standards debate that is often seen in the
accounting industry.10 3 Those who prefer standards claim that if the
definition of independence is too specific and stringent it will be easier
for companies to take the checklist approach of meeting the specified
requirements without looking at the substance of the entire situa-
tion. 0 4 They would advocate that it is better to have guidelines rather
than specific rules; and that since the Exchange has provided specific
guidance as to what may be considered a material relationship, it has
provided adequate guidelines for companies to have notice of who
will qualify as an independent director, without limiting potential non-
independent relationships to those specific business relationships that
have been previously identified. 105
The author agrees that if the Exchange had instead simply listed a
set of specific relationships that would render a director non-indepen-
dent, there could soon develop an onslaught of companies attempting
to get around the form of the forbidden relationships without actually
102. This would be a function of the rate of turnover of the company's management, its board,
and its internal and external auditors.
103. Daniel L. Berger & Michael L. Cypers, Accountants Liability After Enron, in B-1209
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, Gwyn Quillan, Trends and Cur-
rent Issues in Professional Standards, GASS and GAAP, 11-13 (risk that movement away from
check-the-box approach to reporting will result in wider range of judgments... SEC representa-
tives are clearly concerned with articulating more standards based principles) (New York City,
Practicing Law Institute 2002). But see Letter from Darla C. Stuckey, Corporate Secretary, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/
abouthome.html?query=/About/report.html (urging the NYSE to avoid the type of specificity that
would lead to check-box type compliance).
104. Note: this is a complaint accountants hear time and time again regarding the U.S. rules
based accounting system.
105. Berger & Cypers, supra note 103.
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changing the substance. 10 6 There is a risk that boards of directors will
use minimum standards to act in such a manner, and lose sight of the
big picture. With respect to independence, it seems to make more
sense to look at each situation in its entirety rather than simply ques-
tioning if a director has met a checklist of forbidden relationships, in
order to get to the substance of the relationship in question.
Finally, the substance of the proposed independence requirements,
although an improvement on the previous, seems lacking in that it
does not reach the topic of potential loyalties the directors may have
to one and another due to their past relationships among themselves.
This is a separate issue from examining each director's past relation-
ship with the company, but it seems as if prior loyalties between dif-
ferent board or audit committee members could have an influential
effect on the way in which they vote. Thus, the author recommends
the NYSE address this issue in its next listings requirement revision.
3. Brief Comparison to the Independence Requirements Passed by
the SEC under S.O. § 301
The independence rules promulgated under S.O. § 301 are more
general than those proposed under the NYSE listing requirements.
For example, SEC Release No. 33-8220 notes that there is an excep-
tion under S.O. § 301 for a director who holds a non-management po-
sition; there is no such expectation under the listing requirements.
Next, while the listing requirement impose a five-year cooling-off pe-
riod, the independence rules under the S.O. Act apply to current rela-
tionships only. Additionally, the "affiliate" definition under the S.O.
Act is relatively vague and general, while the proposed listing require-
ments note specific types of relationships that are prohibited. Finally,
the S.O. Act rules provide a safe-harbor for control for non-executive
officers and those who own less than 10% of the issuer securities while
the listing requirements focus on the interrelationships between the
parties and do not afford a similar safe-harbor.
4. Heightened Disclosure as an Alternative to Heightened
Independence Definitions
Regardless of the substance of the new definitions and require-
ments, the NYSE will not affect change unless the proposed changes
effect the actions of boards and audit committees. Despite the tight-
106. Manuel A. Rodriguez, The Numbers Game: Manipulation of Financial Reporting By Cor-
porations and their Executives, U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 451, 453 (2002) (noting that the substance
over form doctrine has been widely accepted as the prevailing standard in evaluating the nature
of a transaction).
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ening of the independence definitions and requirements, many organi-
zations and investors feel as if the terminology itself is not the
problem, and that simply changing the definition of "independent"
will have little or no effect. 10 7 Comments to the proposed rules sug-
gest an alternative focus on changing disclosure rules rather than inde-
pendence requirements. 10 8 Through its proposed audit committee
requirements, the Exchange has partially addressed the issue of
disclosure.109
The proposed rules allow listed companies to adopt and disclose
categorical standards to assist in making independence determinations
such that only determinations for directors who do not meet the stan-
dards must be specially explained and disclosed."10 Furthermore, S.O.
§ 301 requires listed companies to include in their proxy statements
only certain disclosures about their audit committee along with a for-
mal report of the audit committee."1 Thus, although the new rules
have heightened disclosure requirements they still will not result in
full public disclosure about every individual director; this is an issue
that should continue to be addressed.
A prominent example showing how companies can get around cate-
gorical and non-individualized director independence disclosure re-
quirements can be seen through the fall of Enron. One of the
problems at Enron was that the company was able to claim the inde-
pendence of their directors because the ties that existed were not ones
that had to be specifically disclosed as they did not meet any categori-
cally prohibited types of relationships. To avoid this type of situation,
107. NYSE Report, supra note 99, at A-49 (citing Nell Minow Editor, The Corporate Library
"tinkering with the definitions of 'independence director' or removing non-independent direc-
tors on various committees will have no real impact. 'Independent' can mean 'indifference."').
108. NYSE Report, supra note 99, at A-49; see also Stanley Keller, Disclosure & Other Les-
sons Learned After Enron: What you need to know to File Your 10-K & Other Forms, in CORPO-
RATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 291 (Practicing Law Institute 2002)
(implicating that both independence and disclosure standards for the board must be revisited).
109. Note: the proposed listing requirements for specific disclosures apart from § 303A are
outside the scope of this paper. See Keller, supra note 108, for a detailed analysis of other
disclosure proposals that have been discussed in response to Enron. Note that both the pro-
posed listing requirements and S.O., supra note 1, § 301, require disclosure related to the inde-
pendence status of audit committee members.
110. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A2(a). See also BRAIOITA, supra note 10, at
54.
111. SEC Release No. 33-8220, supra note 42. See also, SEC Release No. 34-42266, supra note
28 (regarding specific audit committee disclosures that issuers must make in their proxy
statements).
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investors need to complete disclosure of all ties between board mem-
bers, the company, and management. 112
Although a requirement that each company disclose all relevant in-
formation about each director (i.e. no categorical standards used) was
shot down in part due to the time and effort that it would require,
something in between may well be required. 113 For example, perhaps
the Exchange should consider requiring each listed company to up-
date and disclose its standards for determining director independence
annually, which would at least keep it from becoming complacent.
Furthermore, perhaps each year, the oversight board (once in place)
or SEC should come up with a novel list of topics and questions re-
garding each director's independence that listed companies must ad-
dress and develop different topics each year. This would at least work
to keep companies on their toes if they did not know in advance ex-
actly what they would have to answer and report on. Alternatively,
perhaps some kind of spot check would work to keep companies hon-
est. For example, as the IRS audits a random sample of returns each
year, perhaps the SEC or Exchange can audit a certain percentage of
listed company's director independence disclosures each year.
5. More Information is Required
In the end, how the listed companies react to and implement the
new independence requirements must be seen before any absolute
conclusions can be made regarding the sufficiency of the proposed list-
ing requirements. Yet, in the meantime, the suggestions mentioned
above are areas that could be examined in more detail.
a. Hypothetical Example of the Type of Problematic Relationships
that should be more fully Considered under the Proposed
Listing Requirements
Suppose a former consultant who performed consulting services for
Company X when working for a "Big Four" Corporation Y meets the
new independence requirements for X's audit committee membership
five-years after leaving his consulting job. Suppose further, when the
consultant was at his consulting job he developed a close relationship
112. This requirement should be met by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to some extent. See also
NYSE Report, supra note 99, at A-49 (noting the Comment from American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations).
113. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A & cmts., at A6. I agree with the conclusion
to allow disclosure of standards in lieu of disclosures regarding all directors on the grounds that
an average investor would likely be overwhelmed by too much information. Yet, I think it is
better to provide such information to the investor so they can chose to look at it and get help
analyzing it if they chose to do so.
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with the members of the audit team for the same client X. -Now, the
former consultant (who has the requisite independent and financial
literacy) sits on the audit committee of X for which Y is still the cur-
rent auditor.
b. Analysis
In the situation described above, the new rules are technically met
but they have not preempted a situation where an audit committee
member has a relationship with an external auditor.11 4 Furthermore,
since the same independence definitions, apart from compensation
which is not relevant in this hypothetical, are now applied to board
members and to audit committee members, it does not seem as if the
requirements protect this situation for an audit committee member
any differently than for an independent board member. In fact, the
audit committee member in the hypothetical may have more incentive
to approve non-audit services as he used to provide them.
The above hypothetical in part circles back to the problem of rules
of form versus substance. The rule is met, but if the idea or substance
behind the rule was to preserve independence between parties, then it
will not always do so. This is an example of the realistic fact that no
system of rules and regulations can account for all contingencies. In
the end the quality of the financial reporting system will continue to
depend on the integrity and ethical standards of individuals.1 15
B. Composition
1. Membership and Focus
In 1978, when the audit committee-listing requirement was first im-
plemented, the rules did not specifically require audit committee
members to have a financial background.11 6 Rather, a general man-
agement background combined with reasonable skill in interpreting
financial statements was considered most desirable.11 7 Although, it
was also generally understood that there should be at least one com-
114. Note this hypothetical also implicates the gap in the independence rules notes in Section
VI.A. regarding audit committee service by former employees.
115. However, if a situation such as the hypothetical arose it would be interesting to see if that
individual was disqualified from the selection process in the same manner former CPAs have
sometimes been.
116. Report of National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting ("Treadway Com-
mission"), (1987) [hereinafter Treadway Commission].
117. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 27; Treadway Commission, supra note 116;
BRAIO-rFA, supra note 10, at 6; BACON, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that for this reason retired
CEOs, and former high-level executives comprise a large percentage of audit committee
membership).
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mittee member with a strong financial background to facilitate com-
munication with the auditors and the committee's understanding of
the auditing process, the desired qualities focused on for audit com-
mittee members were: communication skills, curiosity, and a healthy
skepticism; qualities considered necessary to ask probing questions
and get answers that go to the heart of an organization's activities
without alienating organization members.118 Now, the listing require-
ments and the S.O. § 407 rule for "audit committee financial experts"
focus membership inquiry more on the quantitative financial qualifi-
cations of potential members rather than their qualitative communica-
tion and curiosity attributes.
The 1999 revision to the listing requirements included more specific
financial literacy requirements, and the general composition literacy
requirements will not change following the implementation of the pro-
posed 2002 listing standards. An audit committee will still be required
to have at least three independent directors, unaffiliated with manage-
ment or ownership of the corporation, who are all able to analyze and
interpret financial statements and reports; at least one member of
whom has specific financial or accounting expertise. 119
However, although the listing requirement for financial experts re-
mains the same, S.O. § 407 imposes much more specific requirements
that audit committee members of listed companies will also have to
meet. 120 The commentary to SEC Release No. 33-8177 notes that the
term "audit committee financial expert" was used in the rule in re-
sponse to concerns that there are many types of financial experts -
such as capital raisers, risk analysts, and valuation experts that would
not necessarily have any characteristics relevant to the audit commit-
tee's function of oversight over accounting matters and an under-
standing of financial statements. 12' Although only one "audit
committee financial expert is required" this at least ensures one per-
son with heightened expertise; additionally, the rules permit but do
not require company disclosure when it has more than one audit com-
mittee financial expert on its committee. 122 The application of this
118. BRAIOI-rA, supra note 10, at 6; APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 28; Hon. Ar-
thur Levitt Jr., Lecture: Inaugural Address: Costs Paid with Other People's Money, 6 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 263 (2001) (noting that there is no substitute for asking hard questions).
119. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A6 & cmts., at 9. The Exchange originally
considered requiring the director to be a financial expert but put such a requirement on hold
pending implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
120. See supra Section V.F for a detailed discussion of the requirements.
121. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A6 & cmts., at 9 (originally used the term
"financial expert").
122. Id. Note that in addition to the specified background requirements, audit committee
members must also meet the more general independence requirements discussed above; inde-
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requirement on the listed companies' audit committees seems positive
in that "expert" audit committee members should be more able to
spot unusual accounting instances; yet, the concern that the specified
requirements displace the initial desired communication, skepticism
and curiosity attributes was also visible in the commentary regarding
this Release. In response to commentary that the proposed definition
was too restrictive, the final rules allow leeway by qualifications due
to "other similar experiences"; a company that believes that an audit
committee member qualifies through such experience should be able
to explain why. 123 Furthermore, it is possible that through requiring
one member with heightened background financial experience, the
nominating committees will in turn shift their focus more to the non-
numerical desired qualities in the selection of other members.
Apart from the new expertise requirements imposed under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as analyzed above in Section V., what has
changed regarding the audit committee membership composition is
the applicable definition of independence. Thus, the relationships
each member has with the company may be limited in different ways
than in the past.
Despite the fact that audit committee members are subject to more
stringent independence requirements, it is not clear that modern com-
mittees continue to meet original desired qualities of curiosity, skepti-
cism, and communication. 124 The number of people who have served
as audit committee members, and the number of committees that an
individual member has or does serve on has grown with the number of
listed companies. Although prior audit committee experience is good
in the sense that it lowers the learning curve for each new position and
helps members have points of comparison for how things are or
should be done to conform with listing and regulatory requirements,
there is the countervailing concern that as audit committee service be-
comes more commonplace, members lose their focus, curiosity, skepti-
cism, and diligence. 125
Another related concern is that when individuals serve on more
than one audit committee they will have less time and energy to get to
the hard questions, and will become more complacent when some-
pendence for purposes of this rule is defined by reference to § 1OA(m)(3) of the Exchange Act
and Item 7(d)(3(iv) of Schedule 14A.
123. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A6 & cmts., at 9. Note that the final rules
make some exceptions and provide some further guidance for foreign issuers; but detailed exam-
ination of this is beyond the scope of this paper.
124. Levitt, supra note 120, at 266.
125. Levitt, supra note 120, at 266. For example, when you think you have seen something
done before (and ok'd it); it is easier to skim over the details without asking as many questions.
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thing "looks right"; thereby accepting the surface form of a transac-
tion rather than delving into the substance. 26 Ironically, one of the
benefits to come out of Enron type scandals may be that due to in-
creased liability concerns, people will serve on fewer audit committees
which may in turn increase their level of service for those on which
they remain. 127
2. Relevant Topics that the Composition Requirements
Fail to Address
With respect to audit committee composition there are several is-
sues that the listing requirements do not reach that have the potential
to affect the communication skills, curiosity, and degree of skepticism
of audit committee members.
a. Length of Service
First, there is no required minimum or maximum length of service.
As mentioned above, experience for audit committee members can be
a double-edged sword. Experience is good in that an individual will
have the skills necessary to read and interpret financial statements,
and to interact with management, the internal auditors, and the exter-
nal auditors; thus, terms should be long enough to develop seasoned
judgment.1 28 However, experience can also lead to complacency.1 29
Experts have suggested that rotation of audit committee members
would: (1) spread the burden of time involved in serving; (2) foster
new ideas; and (3) maintain the independence of members since they
would not have a chance to grow to identify with management. 130
Comments to the proposed listing requirements have suggested limit-
ing the length of service on a board under the theory that as the length
126. Levitt, supra note 120, at 266. See also David B. Harms & Edward J. Rosen, The Impact
of Enron: Regulatory, Ethical and Practice Issues for Counsel to Issuers, Underwriters and Finan-
cial Intermediaries, in LAWMAKERS & REGULATORS RESPOND TO THE ENRON COLLAPSE: WE
NEED NEW RULES, at 99 (Corporate Law and Practice Handbook Series, No. B-1321, 2002);
Lubin, supra note 100, at C1.
That being said, I find it unbelievable that Enron's audit committee had no idea what was
going on behind the "front" of allowable business transaction; there are some situations where
the wool can be pulled over the audit committee members eyes, but there are others where he or
she must choose to "look away".
127. See supra Section VII.B. of this paper for an analysis of the liability of audit committee
members.
128. MAUTZ & NEUMANN, supra note 8, at 24-25 (noting that typical lengths of service started
off as one year appointments and grew over time); STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at
39.
129. APOSTOULOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 27.
130. BACON, supra note 3, at 9.
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of service grows, it becomes difficult to maintain disattachment and
intellectual independence. t 31
It could be beneficial if the Exchange and the SEC perform studies
(perhaps through the new oversight board) to determine a maximum
length of service that would best take advantage of members' experi-
ence, yet avoid complacency. Several commentators have suggested
2-3 years as appropriate.1 32 Furthermore, perhaps as part of their an-
nual performance evaluation requirement by § 3037(b)(iii), audit
committees along with input from the entire board of directors, should
evaluate the quality of service and contributions by each member and
composition and be required to disclose such evaluation to investors.
(Which, as noted above, is not currently required in their annual per-
formance evaluation).
b. Limit to the Number of Boards and Audit Committees an
Individual can Simultaneously Serve On
Second, neither the 1999 or proposed listing requirements require a
listed company to limit the number of boards that an audit committee
member can serve on. The Exchange only provides that:
if an audit committee member simultaneously serves on the audit
committee of more than three public companies ... then in each
case, the board must determine that such simultaneous service
would not impair the ability of such member to effectively serve on
the listed companies audit committee and disclose such determina-
tion in the annual proxy statement.133
This statement is discretionary and does not provide guidance for how
such a determination should be made. A company that really wants to
have a specific audit committee member need only disclose why, in
the board's opinion, that member has time to serve. 134 This will po-
tentially lead to a wide range of standards and cut-offs used by compa-
nies implementing this requirement that could cause investor
confusion. Furthermore, apart from required disclosure of service on
more than three audit committees, there is no mention of any limita-
tion on the number of boards an individual can serve on.
The author agrees with industry commentary that there should be a
limit on the number of directorships an individual holds in order to
131. Report from the New York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Stan-
dards Committee, supra note 99, at A-19. See also STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at
39 (noting that the appropriate term must be decided by a balancing of experience and staleness
or complacency).
132. CICA, supra note 4, at 70-75.
133. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A6 and cmts., at 10.
134. Id.
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ensure audit committee members can meet the demands of their re-
sponsibilities. 135 For example, perhaps the NYSE should limit simul-
taneous service to three audit committees and one additional board
position. The requirement should attempt to strike a balance between
building experience and expertise and overloading any one individual.
Audit committee members have to have the time and energy to per-
form their jobs such that the hard questions will be asked; individuals
who are rushed often take the shortest corners to avoid the difficult
and potentially time-consuming questions. 136 Yet, those who do serve
need the experience required to identify and analyze what the hard
questions are.1 37
Warren Buffet once suggested that the audit committee's core pur-
pose of accurate financial reporting and oversight could be summed
up in the following three questions:
'If you were solely responsible for the preparation of the company's
financial statements, how would they be different?' Or 'If you were
an investor, would you be able to learn from the financial state-
ments information essential to understanding the company's finan-
cial performance?' Or, 'Is the company following the same internal
audit procedures as it would if you were the CEO?' 138
These questions seem like a good place for an audit committee to
start in order to analyze if it has ownership over oversight of the finan-
cial processes, but as industries and technologies advance many more
questions need to be asked for full oversight. One place to start in
ensuring that the questions are asked is formulating rules to ensure
the committee members have sufficient time to ask them.139
c. Number of Meetings an Audit Committee Must Hold Each Year
Third, neither the current nor the proposed listing standards specify
how many times a year the audit committee should meet. However,
the consensus among companies is that four meetings are sufficient. 140
As a listing of required duties and responsibilities that must be accom-
135. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 34 ("perhaps audit committee members
should limit the number of directorships they hold so they can meet the demands of their audit
committee responsibilities.").
136. BACON, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that in 1987, 64% of surveyed CEO and CFOs believe
that service on the audit committee take more time now than ten-years ago and will take even
more time in the future).
137. Levitt, supra note 120, at 266-67. See also, Conference Audit Proceedings, supra note 4,
at 91 (an important job of the audit committee is to ask challenging questions).
138. Noelle Knox, Buffet Tells Auditors to Really Dog Auditors, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 4, 2002,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/finance/2002-03-05-accounting-roundtable.htm.
139. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 34.
140. BACON, supra note 3, at 23; STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 39.
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plished annually is set forth in § 303A7, it may be somewhat duplica-
tive to also require a certain number of meetings. However, some
guidance could be helpful. It seems like an audit committee that
rushed through and met all the facial requirements of § 303A7 during
the course of one meeting, while perhaps maintaining the status quo,
would be much less effective than a committee that divided up the
tasks and met several times a year to monitor progress and comple-
tion. Specially, a 1987-1997 survey found that most audit committees
of "fraud companies" met only once a year.141 Thus, a minimum num-
ber of required meetings should be proposed; best practices guidelines
suggest committees meet at minimum four times a year. 142
d. Other Miscellaneous Composition Topics
In future revisions the Exchange may want to address: requiring an
odd number of audit committee members for resolving voting issues
and requiring staggered terms. Good practice guidelines have recom-
mended the audit committee be composed of three or more individu-
als with an odd number to preempt voting disputes. 143
3. Alternative Composition Suggestions to Enhance the
Performance of Audit Committees
The key to a good committee seems to be in the composition or
miX. 1 44 Despite the fact that many listed companies have established
nominating committees, something that seems to be lacking in today's
audit committees is the asking of tough questions.145 Nominating
committees often come up with the following types of candidates for
audit committee membership: academics, CPAs, internal auditing di-
rectors of unrelated organizations, lawyers, retired CEOs, and senior
executives from unrelated organizations. 146 These types of candidates
continue to be thought of as ideal. However, these are also the people
who are most likely to have served on numerous other audit commit-
tees. Perhaps, something different is needed.
141. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 53.
142. Id.
143. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 81; BRAiOTrA, supra note 10, at vii.
144. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 28.
145. Levitt, supra note 120.
146. NYSE Standards, supra note 39, § 303A4, The NYSE proposed listing requirements also
propose the required establishment of a nominating committee for listed firms.
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a. Require One Audit Committee Member with a
Financial Stake in the Company
One suggestion for reform is requiring one audit committee mem-
ber who has a financial stake (either directly or indirectly) in the com-
pany to mix up the norm. 147 Since a role of the audit committee is to
oversee the independent and internal audits, such that investors are
presently with fair and accurate information, it seems that allowing or
requiring an investor to be represented on the committee would be a
step towards this goal. However, to really implement such a rule
would require a complete analysis of moral hazard and freeloading, as
well as incentives and representativeness. It could be difficult to con-
vince a small investor to take the time and potential liability to serve,
and too big an investor could potentially have interests adverse to the
minority interest. So, this suggestion might not be feasible. In addi-
tion, current rules forbid audit committee members from having any
financial stake in the company, regardless of if they are otherwise in-
dependent, and it would be very messy and risky to turn those rules
on their heads; not to mention perhaps politically impossible. 148
b. Require the Audit Committee to Address Investor Proposed
Questions During Discussions with Management,
Internal, and External Auditors
An overarching concern of the Exchange in updating its listing stan-
dards is to "allow shareholders to more easily and efficiently monitor
the performance of companies and directors in order to reduce in-
stances of lax and unethical behavior. ' 149 An alternative and likely
novel suggestion that would not actually change the composition of
the audit committee, but could potentially enhance monitoring of the
audit committee's performance, would be to allow investors to pro-
pose "audit committee questions" in the same manner that they can
sometimes make proxy proposals. Currently, audit committees are re-
quired to report to and meet with external auditors, internal auditors,
147. NYSE Standards, supra note 39, §303A2(a) and cmts., at 5. Stock ownership alone will
not render a director non-independent for board membership but may cause problems for audit
committee membership as audit committee members are not supposed to have a financial stake
in the company.
148. NYSE Standards, supra note 39, § 303A6. It is not well analyzed or clear if in allowing,
much less requiring, a stock owner to serve on the audit committee would be a good idea of it if
would present that investor with an unfair advantage over other stock holders; this is a topic that
perhaps should be investigated by the new Public Oversight Board. Note that S.O. § 407 allows
one audit committee member with less than 10% stock ownership.
149. NYSE Standards, supra note 39, § 303A and cmts., at 2.
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and the board of directors, but there is no requirement that they meet
separately with or answer directly to interested investors.1 50
If investors were allowed to propose tough questions they wanted
answered and the audit committee had to ask management and/or the
auditors those questions, perhaps, the harder questions would more
likely to be asked. One risk with this suggestion is that the investors
who may not be financially literate will not know which questions to
ask; however, there are enough institutional and large investors hold-
ing stock that this risk seems nominal compared to the potential up-
side. Furthermore, just as it has implemented a proposed list of things
the audit committee's charter must include in § 303A7, perhaps the
Exchange in conjunction with the SEC or oversight board can brain-
storm a suggested list of questions for investors' reference under
§ 303A.151 While this type of requirement may make the audit com-
mittee members' jobs more difficult, it could also help to focus them
in the right direction regarding what issues the investing public wants
to know, and what issues to be concerned about. Also, with respect to
the critique that a normal investor will not know what to look for to
uncover fraud or deception, the investors' questions would not replace
the current questions and duties of the audit committee, but could
supplement them.
4. Non-Complacency and Time as Key Characteristics
In the end, audit committees should ideally consist of: people with a
general understanding of company's industry and social, political, eco-
nomic, and legal forces which affect the industry; knowledge of com-
pany history, organization and operational policies; an understanding
of fundamental problems of planning and control as well as the funda-
mentals of the functional aspect of the company; and both financial
and non-financial people. 52 Audit committees should also consist of
members with the time and energy required to devote to the position.
The author agrees with practice guidelines that suggest if an audit
committee is larger than three it should still be small enough for all
members to be active and required participants. 153 Further, although
the above suggestions and criticisms are interesting ones that could
150. NYSE Standards, supra note 39, § 303A7.
151. Note this list should be a starting point not an end point limit on which questions inves-
tors may raise.
152. See supra notes 117, 118, 131-33.
153. BRAIOT-rA, supra note 10, at vii (recommending that the committee be large enough to
involve a reasonable range of viewpoints, but small enough to work efficiently).
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help reach the ideal type of composition; they are by no means ex-
haustive, and have not been tested in practice.
C. Written Charter
With the establishment of stricter guidelines for audit committees, it
is increasingly important that each committee have a comprehensive
written charter.
1. Development of this Requirement and Debate over the
Purpose and Scope Specification
From the initial establishment of audit committees, it was thought
that an audit committee should be guided by a written charter to es-
tablish its roles and responsibilities within the organization; since the
1999 listing requirements it has been required and each issuers' proxy
must disclose if its board has adopted a written charter. 154
a. Purpose of the Written Charter
The purpose of a formal charter is to help guide the audit commit-
tee in fulfilling its responsibilities effectively and in a timely man-
ner. 155 Under corporate law such a charter can be established through
a board resolution or may be incorporated into bylaws of a corpora-
tion.15 6 In the past, it was thought that charters should be flexible
enough to meet the changing needs of the business environment. 157
Originally, each board of directors was responsible for assigning its
audit committee functions that meshed with its own structure and phi-
losophy; yet it was recognized early on that the audit committee
should also be free to exercise independent and objective judgment
including the authority to investigate any organizational activity as it
deems necessary and appropriate.15 8
b. Scope of the Written Charter
The topic of exactly what functions should in fact be assigned to the
audit committee has always been highly debated.15 9 Some people
think that the only function required by law should be "to review the
154. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303.01B; STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note
17, at 16 (noting that the duties agreed upon by the board of directors and the audit committee
should be specified clearly in a charter so all parties understands their duties); BACON, supra
note 3, at 25; SEC Release No. 33-8220, supra note 44.
155. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37 § 303.01B.
156. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 33 (2002).
157. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 23; BRAIOTrA, supra note 10, at 4.
158. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 35.
159. BRAIOTTA, supra note 10, at 4.
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annual audited financial statements before board approval. '160
Others believe that all "closely related" functions should also be dele-
gated to the audit committee, including review of: (1) external report-
ing; (2) the audited annual financials; (3) review of changes in
accounting principles and practice; (4) all financial reports which re-
quire approval by the board; (5) the financial content of all sections of
the annual report to ensure consistency with the audited financials;
and the authority to make recommendations to the full board regard-
ing (6) the appointment of external auditor; reviews of audit fees; (7)
the scope and timing of audit work; (8) any problems encountered
during the audit; (9) any conflicts between management and the audi-
tors.161 These are the types of duties that have been delegated to the
audit committee through S.O. § 301 and SEC Release No. 33-8220.162
Further, under both the old and new NYSE listing requirements, most
of the "closely related" functions have in fact been delegated to the
audit committee, and the scope of their responsibility for each particu-
lar task has been more specifically delineated over time. 163 However,
despite the increasingly tightened specifications for the written char-
ter, as recently as February 13, 2002, legal counsel has continued to
recommend that audit committees maintain flexibility in their
chartered duties as part of industry best practices. 164
The debate over the specificity of the charter goes to the idea that,
with increasingly specific charter requirements it becomes arguably
more difficult for companies to maintain necessary flexibility and tai-
loring of roles.165 However, two purposes of tightening the require-
ments are: improved corporate governance and oversight, and to raise
corporate governance and disclosure standards. 66 One goal in the
modifications of listing requirements is to strike a more proper bal-
ance between these conflicting ideals; both purposes and goals are
widely held by industry experts.
160. CICA, supra note 4, at 4.
161. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 3, 49; BRAIOTIrA, supra note 10, at 9-14; Barr,
supra note 7, at 19 (noting customary roles include reviewing financial statements, testing con-
trols, investigating reserves and supervising the external and internal auditors).
162. See supra Section V.B.1.
163. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A(B).
164. Keller, supra note 108. Note that this recommendation was made prior to the unveiling
of the 2002 NYSE proposed listing requirements which incorporate much more specific charter
requirements for the audit committee.
165. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, After Enron: Issues for Boards and Audit Committees to
Consider, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 361 (Practicing Law
Institute 2002) (noting that perhaps this increased specificity is not good as they recommend
audit committees maintain flexibility in their charters in order to maintain the ability to focus on
policies and issues which may change over time).
166. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A and cmts., at 2.
[Vol. 2:99
2003] NYSE - PROPOSED AUDIT COMMITTEE REQUIREMENTS 135
The 1999 listing requirements specify that the audit committee char-
ter list certain roles, accountabilities, and the scope of the committees'
responsibility and relationship with the outside auditors and the board
of directors. 167 Now, the Exchange has gone one step further and in
addition to delineating general roles; § 303A7 proposes specific pur-
poses and ten specific duties and responsibilities that the audit com-
mittee must, at minimum, include in its written charter. Time will
show the impact of the increased specificity in charter requirements.
2. Will the Increased Specificity in Written Charter Requirements
Positively Change What is Done in Practice?
a. Increased Authority and Responsibility over the
Independent Auditors
Perhaps the most significant change incorporated in both
§ 303A7(a) of the proposed listing requirements and S.O. § 301
through SEC Release No. 33-8220, is the granting to the audit com-
mittee of "sole authority to hire and fire the independent auditors,
and to approve any significant non-audit relationship with the inde-
pendent auditors.' 168 Previously the audit committee had limited au-
tonomy in this area since the board made the final decision concerning
any of the committees' recommendations. 169 For example, the 1999
listing standards granted the audit committee and the board of direc-
tors ultimate authority and responsibility over selection, evaluation,
replacement, and nomination of the outside auditors. 170
The modifications in the audit committees' scope of authority
should enhance the independence between the audit committee, the
board, and management as a whole. The new definitions of indepen-
dence for audit committee directors and the new definitions of inde-
pendence for outside auditors in the proposed requirements mitigate
the likelihood that they will have ties to each other. This is the same
type of reasoning behind the theory that while it has always been
thought that non-practicing CPAs are valuable for audit committee
membership they do not participate in the selection of the auditors. 171
To maintain the integrity and oversight of the financial reporting pro-
167. Id. § 303.01(B)(1). Three specific requirements and responsibilities must be specified.
Id.
168. Id. § 303A7(a).
169. BRAIO-rrA, supra note 10, at 24.
170. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(a). When referring to the external audi-
tors, there was a terminology change from "outside" auditors in § 303.01 to "independent" audi-
tors in § 303A. Alone the change is linguistic; its significance comes from the updated
definitions of auditor independence developed by the FASB, AICPA and SEC.
171. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 27.
136 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
cess it is better if those whom are responsible for overseeing the exter-
nal auditors have no prior ties to or affiliation with them.172
Additionally, administratively and numerically, it will be easier to
monitor the presence of relationships between the independent audi-
tors and those who select and evaluate them if fewer parties are
involved.
Along with the authority to hire and fire, under both the S.O. and
NYSE rules, the audit committee will have authority to approve all
audit engagement fees, terms, and any significant non-audit engage-
ments with the independent auditors. 173 Despite the fact that the new
listing standards also require a majority independent board, propo-
nents of the updated requirements felt that the best way to preempt
any connection or allegiances was to leave the oversight and authority
in the hands of the audit committee alone.
Whether delegating the selection of the independent auditor solely
to the audit committee will have any effect on the financial reporting
process remains to be seen. Although it appears as if this is the best
way to preempt allegiances, only time will tell how the system will
respond to actual pre-existing relationships (or glitches).
b. Purposes Required to be Included with Specificity
In contrast to the general language of § 303, § 303A7(b) of the pro-
posed listing standards require an audit committee to include specific
purposes in its written charter. 174 Previously, it was thought that the
audit committee responsibilities should include review and evaluation
of the annual financial statements before they were submitted to the
board.175 While S.O. § 303 continues to incorporate the general
broad-brush approach to delineating the purposes of the audit com-
mittee and simply notes that the committee is responsible for all ac-
counting matters, the proposed listing requirements specify which
purposes the audit committee must include in its written charter.1 76
These are: (1) to assist board oversight and prepare a separate report
for the SEC; (2) to oversee the integrity of the financial statements
and the company's compliance with legal and regulatory require-
ments; and (3) to oversee the independent auditor's qualifications and
172. See also independence requirements in NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A2(b)
and supra Section VI.A.
173. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(a). See supra Section VII.A. for a discus-
sion regarding non-audit services.
174. See supra Section IV.C.1. for a detailed description of the specific purposes required.
175. BRAIOTrA, supra note 10, at vii; Barr, supra note 7, at 19.
176. BRAIOTrA, supra note 10, at vii; Barr, supra note 7, at 19.
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independence, and the performance of the internal audit and the in-
ternal auditors. 177 It remains to be seen if adding these formal pur-
poses will change the way the audit committees' function. First and
foremost, the effectiveness of the written charter will depend on if the
audit committee complies with and enforces the charter. Note, that
there is nothing in the listing requirements or S.O. § 301 that enhances
enforcement of the charter, rather the rules focus on having the char-
ter. Thus, enforcement is an issue that should be addressed. 178
In addition, the listed oversight purposes of the audit committee are
arguably not new requirements, § 303.01(B)(1)(a)-(c) previously spec-
ified that the audit committee was responsible for "engaging in dialog
with the outside auditor with respect to any disclosed relationship or
services that may impact the objectivity or independence of the
outside auditor ... and take appropriate action ... to satisfy itself of
the outside auditors' independence"; and it is not clear how else the
committee would oversee the independent auditors independence
apart from engaging in this type of dialog.179
Finally, historically, the audit committee has always been thought of
as the bridge between the internal auditors, external auditors, man-
agement, and the financial reporting process anyway. 180 Thus, requir-
ing the audit committee to oversee the process is not really adding
anything new to the duties it has typically performed; it seems as if the
formal report to the SEC is the only substantively new requirement
for the audit committee's purpose. Yet, perhaps having to officially
report to the SEC will push audit committees to perform more
diligently.
177. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(i)(A). BRAIOITrA, supra note 10, at 8-9;
Barr, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that an additional responsibility of the audit committee in many
companies is to monitor the Corporation's compliance with its Code of Corporate Conduct).
Note that the report to be prepared for the SEC goes along with the 1999 SEC Release No. 34-
442266, supra note 30, which laid out specific proxy statement requirements about audit commit-
tees, and a specific report the audit committee has to prepare and disclose.
178. John F. Olson, How to Really Make Audit Committees More Effective, 54 Bus. LAW. 1097,
1100-01 (1999) (noting that the securities markets themselves have neither the personel in place
nor the enforcement tools to ensure compliance . . . and none of the major markets currently
monitors compliance with their corporate governance standards on a regular basis). Lubin,
supra note 100, at C1 (noting that despite the written charter requirements, Enron's board took
no actions for overseeing ethics-code compliance). Although the audit committee is required to
prepare a year-end report regarding itself, it is not clear how compliance will be overseen.
179. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303.01(B)(1)(a) - (c).
180. Barr, supra note 7, at 22 (the audit committee bears a delegated responsibility from the
board and must sometimes work closely with the internal and external auditors). BACON, supra
note 3, at 19 (the audit committee deals with the Board of Directors, management, the CEO, the
chief internal auditors, and representatives of the outside accounting firm).
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c. Duties and Responsibilities
In addition to specifying which purposes the audit committee must
include in its charter, § 303A7(b)(ii)(A-J) lists ten duties and responsi-
bilities that the written charter must include. However as noted at sev-
eral points below, it is debatable to what extent the requirements
actually modify that which audit committees have historically been re-
sponsible for overseeing. As the analysis for each duty/responsibility
shows, the audit committee has performed most of the newly listed
requirements in the past despite the fact that they were not formally
required.' 8t
i. Hire and Fire the Independent Auditor
This first duty requires the authority given in § 3037(a) - to hire and
fire the company's independent auditors - to be addressed in the writ-
ten charter. As discussed above, this seems a reasonable empower-
ment of the audit committee.
ii. Obtain and Review a Required Report by the
Independent Auditor
Next, the charter must specify that one duty of the audit committee
is to, at least annually, obtain and review a report by the independent
auditor, which describes specifically listed elements. 182 This require-
ment puts the audit committee in a position where it can evaluate the
independent auditors' qualifications, performance, and independence.
There is nothing in the language of the requirement that prohibits the
audit committee from taking into account the opinions of manage-
ment and internal auditors when making such evaluation. 183 Thus,
while seemingly new, this responsibility encompasses those required
in the previous listing requirements: § 303.01(B)(1)(c) delegated to
the audit committee responsibility for ensuring that the outside audi-
tor submitted on a periodic basis a formal written statement including
all relationships between the company and the auditor and discussing
with the outside auditor any relationship or services that could impact
objectivity and independence and § 303.01(B)(1)(b) required that the
181. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 73.
182. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(B) ("describing: the firm's internal
quality-control procedures; any material issues raised by the most recent internal quality-control
review, or peer review, of the firm, or by any inquiry or investigation by governmental or profes-
sional authorities, within the preceding five years, respecting one or more independent audits
carried out by the firm, and steps taken to deal with any such issues; and (to assess the auditor
independence) all relationships between the independent auditor and the company.").
183. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(B).
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audit committee evaluate the qualifications of the outside auditor. 8 4
It also is similar to SEC Release No. 33-42266, which requires that
issuers include reports in their proxies noting if their audit committees
have discussed required matters with the independent auditors, in-
cluding their independence. The novelty of the proposed requirement
is its specificity. In fact, it may be that the charter requirements are
too specific; for example, could limiting the minimum evaluation to
the issues raised in the most recent internal quality-review cause audit
committees to ignore past reviews; and if so, were past reviews some-
thing they normally have looked at anyway?
A jurisdictional issue raised by requiring the review of this report to
be included in the audit committee's written charter is that the charter
is required to specify what the report from the external auditors must
include. Whether it is a proper role for the NYSE to specify what
must be included in an independent auditor report is questionable.
The analysis here would in part depend on if the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) or the American Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants (AICPA) issues an accounting pronouncement or re-
port asking the independent auditor to prepare such a report.
Perhaps changing the wording to require the audit committee "to dis-
cuss" and investigate these issues with the independent auditor, and to
report on them would place the NYSE regulatory reach back in the
hands of the listed company, which seems like the proper scope for a
self-regulatory organization such as the Exchange.
One way to tell if this requirement will change anything is to com-
pare it to present best practices for firms that have performed well.
However, as the collapse of Enron and WorldCom displayed, best
practices do not always equate to sufficient regulation. Thus, once the
new listing requirements are implemented, time will tell if they affect
the way that an audit committee acts.
The commentary to this duty and responsibility listed in
§ 303A7(b)(ii)(B) further suggests that the audit committee should
regularly evaluate the lead partner of the independent auditor and
ensure regular rotation as required by law. 185 Yet, the proposed list-
ing requirement does not implement rotation requirements for either
independent auditors or audit committee members. However, under
SEC Release 33-8183, at minimum, the lead and concurring partners
of the independent audit team must be rotated at least every five
years.
184. However, the new proposal takes away joint responsibility for such an evaluation from
the board as a whole.
185. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(B) and cmts., at 11.
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iii. Discuss Annual and Quarterly Financial Statements with
Management and the Independent Auditor
Third, the audit committee charter must specify that the audit com-
mittee is responsible for regularly discussing the annual audited finan-
cial statements and quarterly statements with management and the
independent auditor, including MD&A disclosures. 186 Solely looking
at the plain language of § 303.01, this requirement seems to be new, as
far as listing requirements go. However, since 1999, the SEC has re-
quired audit committees to discuss and review the audited financial
statements with management.18 7 Further, such discussion of the an-
nual audited financial statements has always been considered part of
the intrinsic duties of the audit committee, and since the 1999 listing
requirements revisions, the committee has also been expected to look
at interim, or quarterly, statements and reports.18 8 Examples of the
types of information the audit committee has previously been ex-
pected to discuss is: management judgments and accounting estimates,
significant audit adjustments, related matters, reportable conditions,
and all interim financial statements. 8 9
In addition to the audit committee meeting with the above men-
tioned groups, for this requirement to have more bite there should
also be a way to ensure that the right questions and analyses are per-
formed during discussions with the audit committee. 190 Perhaps the
new oversight board or the SEC should develop a guide for how an
audit committee may approach such a discussion. Despite the risks of
causing a minimum efforts type phenomenon inherent with providing
a guide or list, in this case a guide seems better than no guidance.
Finally, perhaps the audit committee should be required to meet indi-
vidually with each of these groups prior to the completion of the re-
ports when the interesting discussion and compromises are still taking
place.
iv. Discuss Earnings Press Releases and Guidance Provided to
Analysts and Rating Agencies
Another charter responsibility of the audit committee is to "discuss
earnings press releases, as well as financial information and earnings
guidance provided to analysts and rating agencies."' 19 Apart from
186. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(C).
187. SEC Release No. 34-42266, supra note 28.
188. BRAiOTrA, supra note 10, at 8; MAUTZ & NEUMANN, supra note 8, at 89.
189. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 73.
190. Levitt, supra note 120.
191. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(D).
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mentioning that such a discussion can be done generally and that each
earning release need not be discussed in advance, no specific guidance
is provided for this discussion.' 92 Part of this issue may be taken care
of with the implementation of new analyst and broker disclosure and
separation rules for public companies, but this is an area where the
Exchange should consider providing some additional guidance.
v. Obtain Advice from Outside Expert Advisors as Necessary
Next, the proposed rules implement as a charter duty that the audit
committee hold discussions with and obtain advice as appropriate
from outside legal, accounting, or other advisors without seeking
board approval.' 93 Similarly, S.O. § 301 requires each issuer give its
audit committee the funding and autonomy to engage independent
advisors. This is not a new idea. Since 1978, experts have recom-
mended that it is "advisable for the committee to retain the necessary
professional expertise"; without clearly mentioning whether advance
approval by the board was required. 94 Specifically granting this au-
thority gives the audit committee more leeway in acting without the
entire board. Whether they will use this leeway to consult experts
more, time will show. The S.O. requirement that the issuer provide
funding for audit committee advisors seems like a beneficial addition
to the listing requirements.
vi. Periodically Discuss in a General Manner Risk Assessment
Policies and Procedures with Management
Another duty that must be included in the written charter is to hold
regular discussions regarding the risk assessment and management
policies and procedures of the company. 95 This type of discussion is
of the type that fits under the audit committees' prior oversight func-
tion; but was not specifically delineated. The comments to this section
suggest that since it is the CEO and senior management's job to man-
age risk exposure, the audit committee while, required to discuss ma-
jor risk exposure and steps management has taken to monitor and
control such exposure, it is not required to replace the mechanisms
the company has in place. 196 Thus, the concern over whether the di-
rective "to discuss" has any bite applies here. Perhaps requiring the
192. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(D) and cmts., at 11-12.
193. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(E).
194. BRAIOTrA, supra note 10, at 10.
195. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(F).
196. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(F) and cmts., at 11.
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audit committee to disclose or make public the content of their discus-
sion and analysis would add more substance to this requirement.
vii. Periodically Meet Separately with Management, Internal
Auditors, and External Auditors
The audit committee must meet periodically and separately with
management, internal auditors, and independent auditors.197 In con-
junction with this requirement, § 303A7(c) requires that all listed
companies have an internal audit function. While not specifically re-
quired under § 303, these meetings are the type of recommended
"best practice" that have always been widely followed, and are
thought of as extremely beneficial and important. 198
vii. Review with the Independent Auditor any Audit Problems
The audit committee also has a charter duty to review with the inde-
pendent auditor any audit problems or difficulties and management's
responses, and to include this duty in its charter. 99  Previously, de-
spite not formally being required in the charter, issues the audit com-
mittee has been expected to discuss with the independent auditor
include: any difficulties encountered in performing the audit, any re-
sistance from management, and a general discussion about the exter-
nal auditors relations with management. 200
The commentary accompanying this requirement suggests that the
audit committee regularly review: the work of the independent audi-
tor; any difficulties or restrictions encountered in the course of that
work; any significant disagreements with management or restricted ac-
cess to requested information; any accounting adjustments noted but
passed on; any communications with the independence auditor's na-
tional office over issues presented during the audit; any management
or internal control letters issued or proposed by the audit firm; and
the responsibilities, budget, and staffing for the audit engagement.201
These are similar to the types of issues audit committees have histori-
cally been responsible for overseeing.20 2 This open type of suggested
topics is good in that it gives a starting point to the committee, is flexi-
197. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(G).
198. BACON, supra note 3, at 11 (1987 survey showed that many charters required the audit
committee to meet with outside auditors and 90% of respondents did so at least 2 times a year);
MAUTZ & NEUMANN, supra note 8, at 89-91.
199. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(H).
200. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 73-75; see also, SEC Release No. 33-8183,
supra note 36 (regarding proxy disclosures).
201. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(ii)(H).
202. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(H).
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ble in allowing room for other duties, and sufficiently incorporates
what was done in the past. However, to ensure that an audit commit-
tee does not simply limit its oversight to the suggested topics as a
checklist to go through, and thus neglect to also track other individu-
alized problem areas as needed, perhaps the exchange should require
each committee to submit a summary of items discussed so it can track
how committees may actually move outside the suggested scope.
viii. Establish and Review Hiring Policies for Current and Former
Employees of the Independent Auditor
Another charter item is the audit committees' responsibility to set
"clear hiring policies for employees or former employees of the inde-
pendent auditors. '20 3 Such a policy while a step in the right direction,
should conform to the new independent requirements and will only be
as good as those requirements. See the discussion in Section III.A. for
commentary regarding the proposed independence requirements.
ix. Regularly Report to the Board of Directors Regarding any
Integrity, Legal, Regulatory, or Performance Issues
Involving the Financial Statements or the Performance
of the Internal or External Audit
Finally, the audit committee is required as a charter duty to report
regularly to the board of directors any issues that affect the integrity
or quality of the company's financial statements, compliance with le-
gal or regulatory requirements, the performance and independence of
the independent auditor, or the performance of the internal audit
function.20 4 This requirement seems to properly encompass the ulti-
mate goal of enhancing the reliability and integrity of financial report-
ing. Yet, it is not clear that troubled companies have not already been
doing this type of reporting, and thus it is not clear that adding this
responsibility will affect change.
For example, as early as 1978 it was recommended that the audit
committee focus its attention on reports of legal counsel including re-
ports regarding governmental, legal, and regulatory compliance.20 5
Examples of the types of matters the audit committee has been ex-
pected to discuss include: any resistance from management during the
audit, internal control structure communications, any noted illegal
acts by the client, related matters noted in the audit, reportable condi-
203. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(H), (I).
204. Id. § 303A7(b)(ii)(H), (J).
205. BRAIOTFA, supra note 10, at 10.
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tions, and any errors and irregularities.20 6 A 1987 survey showed that
98% of respondents' audit committees regularly report to the full
board at least once a year, with an average reporting of three times a
year.20 7
Further examples of the type of performance based communica-
tions that the external auditors have previously held with the audit
committee are: the selection of and any changes in significant account-
ing policies or their application; management judgments and account-
ing estimates; significant audit adjustments; discussion about the
external auditors' relations with management; discussion with the au-
dit committee regarding any difficulties encountered in performing
the audit.208 Thus as mentioned, the extent to which this report will
affect change may be minimal.
x. Annual Performance Evaluation
In addition to purposes, duties, and responsibilities, the audit com-
mittee's written charter must require an annual performance evalua-
tion of the committee.20 9 The commentary accompanying the
proposed requirement suggests that the annual performance evalua-
tion of the audit committee should include an evaluation of major is-
sues regarding accounting principles and financial statement
presentations, specifying any significant changes in the company's se-
lection or application of accounting principles and methods, and
should include an evaluation of major issues regarding the adequacy
of internal controls and any audit steps adopted to make up for any
control deficiencies.2 10 The audit committee should review reports by
the independent auditors and management delineating any significant
financial reporting issues or judgment calls made in preparing the fi-
nancial statements; as well as look at any earnings press releases or
information provided to analysts and rating agencies, particularly
looking at pro forma or non GAAP information. 211 Many of those
topics are similar to those reviewed by independent auditors and re-
ported to the board as noted in § 303A7b(ii) and (I); the New York
Stock Exchange provides more guidance in this area than in any other
regarding audit committees.
206. Id.; APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 73.
207. BACON, supra note 3, at 17.
208. Id.
209. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A7(b)(iii).
210. Id. § 303A7(b)(iii) and cmts., at 12. These responsibilities are also encompassed in
NYSE 2002 Standards § 303A7(b)(ii)(B),(F),(H),(J). Id.
211. Id. § 303A7(b)(iii). This responsibility is also incorporated in § 303A7(b)(ii)(B), (C),
and (D).
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As mentioned in Section IV.C., this annual report could be en-
hanced by adding a requirement that the audit committee also per-
form a detailed evaluation regarding the service and performance of
each member.212 However, this may not be a plausible suggestion,
given the current concerns over increased potential liability due to
service on the audit committee.
xi. Summary of Impact of Written Charter Requirements
Although many of the specifics delineated in § 303A7 may not have
been explicitly required in the past, the audit committee has histori-
cally been responsible for a formal annual report to the board.213 Pre-
viously there was not a standard format required for this report, but it
was thought appropriate to include: the title, date, statement of the
audit committee's mandate, as given in the board's authorizing resolu-
tion or corporate bylaws; scope of review; activities; names of mem-
bers; and signature of the chair.214 The proposed listing requirements
regarding the written charter will force the audit committee to take
specific steps before it can provide a complete report. Yet, as ana-
lyzed in detail above, many of the duties and responsibilities the audit
committee is required to perform are already widely practiced. Thus,
the extent to which the new requirements will change practice is
debatable.
Rather, the main benefit of adding these duties and responsibilities
to the listing requirements may be the notice and disclosure that it
provides to the investing public. As a result, (1) the investing public
will have easy access to and awareness of the proper role of audit
committees and their oversight over the independent auditing process;
(2) there will be enhanced consistency in that all listed companies
must now do all the listed required charter steps rather than should;
(3) and with respect to liability concerns, potential audit committee
members will know in writing in advance what their required rather
than expected duties are.
D. Fees
While the 1999 NYSE listing requirements do not mention fees for
the audit committee, the 2002 proposed requirements specify that au-
212. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 34.
213. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 69 (noting that the audit committee is thought
to be directly accountable to the board; it holds an advisory capacity to the board and its final
authority is limited to final approval by the board). Note to that the SEC has previously re-
quired this type of audit committee report, but the SROs have not.
214. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 69.
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dit committee members' only form of compensation from the com-
pany can be normal director's fees. 21 5 The S.O. § 301 prohibition on
acceptance of fees other than for committee membership service is
similar. However, both the proposed listing requirements and S.O.
§ 301 fail to specifically mention the related topic of non-audit fees
paid to the independent auditors. 216
E. Rotation
Apart from the mandatory rotation of the lead audit partner that is
independently required by state corporate law, the NYSE does not
mandate periodic rotation because of a belief that it may undercut the
effectiveness of the independent auditor and the quality of the au-
dit.217 In contrast, Sarbanes-Oxley § 203 established mandatory five-
year rotation periods for the lead and concurring partners on audit
engagements.218
1. Arguments For and Against Mandatory Rotation
The Exchange itself and commentators have regularly expressed
concern that a mandatory transition could disrupt the financial report-
ing process, deprive auditors of institutional memory and make new
auditors more dependent on management for information.21 9 Apart
from what is otherwise required by law, the proposed listing require-
ments leave the determinations as to whether a company is obtaining
high-quality audits; or if either rotation of the lead audit partner, or
retention of a new independent audit company would be helpful for
the particular company to the judgment of the audit committee. Yet,
as a practical matter all listed companies that are listed on any SEC
Regulated Exchange will have to comply with the SEC limited
mandatory rotations requirements for the lead and concurring audit
partners anyway.
Although autonomy over the rotation of the auditor increases the
independence of the audit committee in one sense, some commenta-
tors feel it also makes it easier for a dishonest audit committee or
215. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A6.
216. See Section VII. of this paper for a discussion regarding non-audit services and fees.
217. NYSE Statement, supra note 11, at 14; Wachtell, et al., Enron/Anderson: Directors Q &
A, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 355 (Practicing Law Insti-
tute 2002) (noting that there is no requirement to switch auditors so the question is solely in the
discretion of management and the board).
218. SEC Release No. 33-8183, supra note 36.
219. Id. (noting that while rotation has been a component of quality control process for audi-
tors for at least 25 years, there is a concern that too much will threaten the integrity and quality
of audits).
[Vol. 2:99
2003] NYSE - PROPOSED AUDIT COMMITTEE REQUIREMENTS 147
single member to collude with the independent auditor for an indeter-
minate period of time. As a result of this risk of collusions and com-
placency, it is the view of Co-Chairman of the NYSE review
committee H. Carl McCall, Comptroller of the State of New York and
Sole Trustee, Common Retirement Fund of the State of New York,
that mandatory rotation may improve auditor independence and
therefore should be mandated.220 Yet, other parties staunchly feel that
mandatory rotation should not be implemented. For example, the
commission has so far been against mandatory rotations because of
the potential disruption of the oversight process.221
The author agrees that mandatory rotation of the independent audi-
tor could result in a better system of oversight. However, on the other
hand, mandatory rotation of audit firms may not accomplish a better
or different result than mandatory rotation of the lead audit partner;
unless other changes are simultaneously made to current practices.
First, to respond to the concern that required rotation of the firm
would disrupt the process and institutional memory, the author does
not think that it is bad. Each audit firm should be able to competently
perform an audit from the ground up. Yes, it may cost more to rotate
firms since institutional memory will not last as long and will have to
be "rebuilt" with each rotation, but this would force the firms, and the
audit committees to step back and look at the process and take initia-
tive over consistently updating and reviewing their methods and
investigation.
For example, many auditors begin a year-end audit by using the au-
dit program from the year before and update it for any new FASB or
SAS pronouncements or requirements. Then they essentially perform
the same audit steps they did the year before. Yes, they are able to
use institutional memory to make the process faster, less costly, and
more time efficient. Yet, they do not always analyze if there were
alternative steps or procedures that would work better, or if there
were additional questions they should ask that had not been relevant
in a previous year. If they find an oddity in their results they then can
go to management and further investigate the cause, but they do not
always talk to management or the internal auditors as much as they
could before setting their audit program.22 2 In contrast, if a new inde-
220. NYSE Statement, supra note 11, at 14. Note that several of the recently proposed ac-
counting reform bills' proposals brought in Congress suggest rotation of the independent audit
form and the lead partner and suggest the SEC perform a study on this topic). See also MAUTZ
& NEUMANN, supra note 8, at 70.
221. Harms & Rosen, supra note 126, at 16.
222. Note: the name of the firm the author worked for and the client the author worked on
have been excluded for privacy purposes. Although the author only worked at one of the "Big
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pendent auditor had been hired to complete the audit for this com-
pany, they would have had to start with management discussion and
observations of the operating methods of the company before com-
posing an audit program.2 23 Furthermore, if a new independent audi-
tor finds anything unusual or unethical about the processes used by
the former, they are supposed to report this information.224 This ob-
servation is not meant to suggest that a new program should be made
from scratch each year; there are certain benefits to institutional mem-
ory - e.g. the auditors know which contacts at the clients will be
straightforward with them and which will try to send them in circles.
However, the best combination could be a limit on the number of
years the same firm can perform a reoccurring audit; five might be a
good number, in light of other five-year time stipulations chosen by
the Exchange, but this would have to be fully investigated.
VII. ADDITIONAL ISSUES THAT IMPLICATE THE AUDIT
COMMITTEE NOT FULLY ADDRESSED IN THE PROPOSED
LISTING REQUIREMENTS
A. Non-Audit Services Performed by Independent Auditors
1. Addressing Non-Audit Services in Conjunction with Rotation
As mentioned above, there is not convincing evidence that
mandatory rotation of audit firms would accomplish a better or differ-
ent result than mandatory rotation of the lead audit partner. In part
this is because most independent auditing firms also offer numerous
non-audit services ("NAS") to both audit and non-audit clients; there
is evidence that this provides incentives that are in opposition to the
potential benefits of mandatory rotation.225
Five" firms, she is aware from conversations with auditors at each that it was the normal industry
practice to use this type of approach in setting the audit program for a recurring client.
223. Note that although the incoming firm is often given copies of the outgoing firms audit
program for the past several years, a new firm is still more likely to come up with a new and
different program in order to attempt to provide the client with superior services utilizing its own
process. Additionally, even if the new firm uses some of the old program, it still has to go
through the steps and questions that will allow it to develop an understanding and familiariza-
tion with the company.
224. This duty falls under the ethical oath that a C.P.A. takes when admitted to practice as
such.
225. Andrew D. Bailey Jr., The Multidisciplinary Practice of Certified Public Accountants and
Lawyers, 52 CASE W. RES. 895, 897-98 (2002) (noting that independent auditing firms have be-
come the largest client services businesses in the world and for some client non-audit fees exceed
audit fees by multiples of 3-30 times). For example, in 2001 Arthur Anderson earned $25M from
Enron for audit services and $27M for NAS. BACON, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that "indepen-
dent audit firms might find it difficult to oppose management over controversial accounting
practices if doing so jeopardizes lucrative management consulting contracts"). See also Deborah
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For example, assume independent audit firm A is providing audit
services for client X and consulting services for clients X and Y. Sup-
pose at the end of five years A is replaced by independent audit firm
B with respect to the audit services provided to client X. Assume A
also performs tax services for client Y and then B provides consulting
services to Y. Generally, if B reports that there were irregularities or
problems with A's audit methods with respect to X, then A may be
investigated by the SEC. This could lead to all A's clients - for any
services - being investigated, including Y. It would be potentially bad
for B if Y were investigated because that could lead to an investiga-
tion of the services Y is receiving from B as well. Even if B is doing
nothing wrong, the taint of an investigation alone goes along way in
the corporate field. Thus, because of the non-audit services B is sup-
plying to Y, B has less incentive to fully investigate A's prior year
audits of X. Similar incentive issues exist if A provides audit services
to X and consulting services to Y; and B provides consulting services
to X and audit services to Y. Neither A nor B has an incentive to
question the methods employed by the other due to the potential im-
pact on its own business or methods.226 Furthermore, this type of situ-
ation makes it easier for one "bad apple" to perpetuate fraud. If there
are separate firms performing the audit and tax engagements, then
each will undertake every required step. Despite the additional cost
duplication may cause, the corresponding benefit is the increased
oversight resulting from the fact that the two teams will in a sense be
"checking" each others work as their results should be the same.
Furthermore, if the additional incentives provided by the simultane-
ous provision of NAS are removed, perhaps we will see more firms
developing different auditing and investigatory methods to complete
Solomon, After Enron, a Push to Limit Accountants to... Accounting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002
at Cl.
226. Additional example: When a single firm provides independent auditing services and
other services to a client there is a potential for negative incentives. For example, suppose Inde-
pendent Auditor Firm A is providing both auditing and tax service to client X. Some of the
procedures that must be undertaken for a complete audit program and a complete tax analysis
are similar. Thus, firm A will have an incentive to perform each required analysis only one time
to save costs. For example, suppose both engagements require that A interview the company's
controller. It would be cost-efficient for A to have one individual perform the interview and
share the result with both the audit and tax engagement teams. However, the problem with this
is that the follow-up questions that should be asked may be different for each type of engage-
ment. Thus, the interviewer may not ask the same "difficult" questions that an auditor would
and should. Furthermore, the engagement teams are likely to rely on each other's work without
asking the same question or performing the same checking that they would if they were indepen-
dent firms.
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the same required audit steps.227 At the same time, this will force the
audit committees to be more aware and less complacent throughout
the oversight process because they will have to ask more questions to
gain an understanding of new or different methods.
2. Addressing Non-Audit Services in Conjunction with Fees
As mentioned, the proposed NYSE listing requirements restrict au-
dit committee members' compensation from the company to normal
directors' fees including the typical additional amount paid to chairs
of committees and to members of committees, that meet more fre-
quently or for longer periods of time. 228 This limitation fails to ac-
count for the incentives provided from non-audit fees paid to the
independent auditors. As discussed above, the fact that independent
auditors provide and are paid for non-audit services can influence
their audit programs and processes, which in turn may influence their
interactions with and oversight by the audit committee. 229 Indepen-
dent auditors may be less inclined to challenge management account-
ing practices for fear of removal from a lucrative NAS contract as
retaliation. Restricting independent auditors to auditing services only
should diminish these incentives. Furthermore, it seems like the only
way to fully address the problem of inter-relationships between inde-
pendent audit firms is to prohibit them from providing non-audit ser-
vices at all; simply restricting the additional services that an audit firm
may provide to its own audit clients is not sufficient.
Thus, based on the above analysis, the author recommends
mandatory independent auditor firm rotation and the elimination of
non-audit services by auditing firms as a best practice. As then Chair-
man of the SEC, Arthur Levitt recognized in his original 2000 propo-
sal for listing requirement changes he would support prohibiting
auditors of public companies from providing NAS to audit clients in
an effort to increase the quality of audit services provided.230 How-
227. Rachel Emma Silverman, Questioning the Books: Deloitte to Separate Consulting Services
From Audit Business, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2002, at A8; Jonathan Weil & Rachel Emma
Silverman, Consulting Unit of Accountant to Go Public, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2003, at A3 (Price-
waterhouseCoopers and Deloitte Touche have announced plans to separate their auditing and
consulting businesses).
228. See supra Section IV.D. of this paper for discussion of the proposed requirements for
audit committee member fees.
229. The Enron Debacle and Gatekeeper Liability: Why Would the Gatekeepers Remain Silent?
Hearing before the Senate Commission on Commerce and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2002)
(testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr. and Joseph Flom). For example, in 2001 Arthur Anderson
earned $25M from Enron for audit services and $27M for NAS.
230. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Release No. 34-
43602 (Oct. 12, 2001) for the watered down version of this proposal that actually passed.
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ever, for the reasons discussed above, the author proposes an even
more radical solution of not allowing independent audit firms to pro-
vide any NAS.
Realistically, the industry and Exchanges are likely not willing to go
that far; so in the alternative, implementing mandatory partner rota-
tion alone will be a step towards removing the biased incentives inher-
ent in the current system.231 Furthermore, current proposals that
auditing firms be prohibited from providing specified listed services is
a step in the right direction.232
B. Liability
The legal liability of the board of directors and the audit committee
has been of increasing concern since the 1990s and is manifested in
state corporation laws and certain federal statutes regarding director-
ate responsibilities. 233 Most, state corporate law statutes currently
limit the board's power to delegate authority and responsibility to
committees. 234 However, with respect to the audit committee, that
limitation has always been discretionary because audit directors can
exercise their own judgment in the interest of the board. With the
addition of written charter requirements, very specific and numerous
responsibilities are specifically delegated to the audit committee. In
fact, an argument behind limiting the number of committees an indi-
vidual can serve on is the underlying concern over the ability of an
231. Bailey Jr., supra note 225; see also SEC Release No. 33-8183, supra note 36 discussing
auditor rotation.
232. Harms & Rosen, supra note 126 (proposing that auditors be restricted from providing:
bookkeeping; financial information and systems design implementation; appraisal or valuation;
internal audit; management or human resources; broker, dealing, investment banker or invest-
ment advisor; legal; expert or any other services designated by the SEC rule).
233. BACON, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that prior to the implementation of the 1999 listing
requirements, one reason there was reluctance to hold audit committees responsible for over-
sight over a company's quarterly financials in addition to its yearly was fear that it would in-
crease members exposure to liability). Conference Audit Proceedings, supra note 4, at 81 (as
early as 1976 experts recognized that at some point in the future the ambers of the audit commit-
tee might be legally held to a higher standard than the board of directors in general). For exam-
ple, see NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW § 712 (McKinney 1963); see also THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE Acrs o 1933 AND 1934; THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT; Kevin Iurato, Warning: A Position of the Audit Committee Could Means Greater Exposure
to Liability: The Problems with Applying a Heightened Standard of Care to the Corporate Audit
Committee, 30 STETSON L. REV. 977 (2001).
234. Dennis J. Lehr, The Emergence of the Corporate Audit Committee, in CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 273; Joseph Hinsey IV, The Impact of the Audit
Committee on Director Liability, 31 (N.Y.C., P.L.I. 1978) (as early as 1978 a number of states had
adopted an affirmative duty of care for corporate directors). BRAIOTrTA, supra note 10, at 44
(noting that state law statutes limits on board's power to delegate responsibilities to commit-
tees); lurato, supra note 233.
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audit committee to properly handle the list of responsibilities assigned
to it in the recommendations. A possible alternative that could be
used to spread the risk of liability is delegating the actual act of firing
and hiring to the entire board while requiring the board to act on the
recommendation of the audit committee. Whether this would have
an effect on the level of liability of audit committee members is debat-
able, but seems likely.2 35
As the proposals stand, in addition to all board members statutory
duties of care and loyalty, the audit committee members will have
some increased responsibility over the delegated duties. Furthermore,
ABA § 35 of its Model Business Corporations Act, increases a direc-
tor's ability to rely on standing committees such as the audit commit-
tee; this leaves questions open as to the potential difference in degrees
of liability or exoneration of committee members.236 In states that
have enacted § 35 of the Model Business Corporations Act, the audit
committee has an additional legal responsibility because other board
members can rely on information provided by a standing committee
such as an audit committee. 237 Thus, while a non-audit committee di-
rector may escape liability if he acts responsibly with due care, an au-
dit committee member may be held to a higher legal standard.2 38
While this legal standard will not change with the proposed standards,
since the list of audit committee responsibilities will be expanded in
the written charter, it is arguable that the non-audit committee mem-
bers will be able to claim reliance on the audit committee in a larger
number of situations. If the scope of liability is narrowed for the
board as a whole the audit committee will correspondingly shoulder
more risk individually.
Legal liability at the federal level includes the Securities Exchange
Acts of 1933 and 1934, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Con-
sistent with § 35 of the Model Business Corporations Act, these acts
allow non-experts to rely on information provided by experts. Al-
though it is not clear whether an audit committee member would be
considered an "expert" for purposes of this act, it is a possibility that
235. Note that unlike the 1999 SEC preliminary Release No. 33-8220 which specifically in-
cluded a safe-harbor for new disclosures in order to protect companies from liability; and 2003
SEC Release No. 33-8177 which specifically provides that "audit committee financial experts"
will not be subject to liability any greater than other audit committee members, the proposed
listing requirements are silent on the potential of increased liability for audit committee mem-
bers as a group.
236. MBCA § 35. BRAIOT-rA, supra note 10, at 45 (noting that § 35 increases directors' reli-
ance on standing committees).
237. Id.
238. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4.
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audit committee members for public companies issuing registration
statements and other filings under those acts should be aware of. If an
audit committee member will be considered an expert over all the du-
ties and responsibilities required to be included in the written charter,
then their official scope of liability will be expanded by the new listing
requirements.
Further, in addition to liability concerns due to the proposed listing
requirements, commentary to S.O. § 407 included the concern that
heightened expertise requirements would lead to heightened liability.
In response to concern that requiring the names of the "audit commit-
tee financial experts" to be listed on the proxy statement would sub-
ject them to higher potential liability, and thus discourage qualified
people from service, the SEC added a safe harbor provision specially
noting that such expert designation does not subject the individual to
any different a degree of liability than regular audit committee mem-
bers.239 Although this safe-harbor does not address the liability of au-
dit committee members vis-a-vis other board members, it can
arguably be seen as evidence that the SEC does not intend to impose
additional liability on committee members for the same reason of dis-
couragement from service.
Liability insurance has long been recommended for board and audit
committee members. Yet, with an increased potential for liability
such insurance will cost more. There is the circular risk that due to
increased insurance costs companies will limit the number of members
on the audit committee to the minimum required - three. This in turn
could make the job harder and could increase the exposure of the
remaining members, consequentially leading to more refusals of re-
quests for audit committee service.240
Despite the risk that the potential liability for audit committee
members is increased by the proposed listing requirements, there are
ways to minimize the potential for legal liability. For example: prac-
tice oversight responsibilities with the degree of care, diligence, and
good faith required by law; document everything necessary to confirm
the diligence with which the committee performs its responsibilities;
and maintain regular communication with the board and with expert
counsel. However, the potential for liability should not be underesti-
mated. The nature of the auditing process and Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards ("GAAS") will remain one in which the profes-
sional judgment of all involved parties is imperative. While the judg-
239. Id.
240. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 61.
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ment of the audit committee may be entitled to the broader corporate
board's business judgment standard of liability review, there is always
the potential for irreparable lapses in judgment.241 There continues
to be a risk that as potential liability increases, it will be harder to find
members to serve.242
A hard question is where to draw the line between an audit commit-
tee that has properly performed its duties, and one, which has not met
its basic oversight responsibilities. Within the business industry, En-
ron is often seen as an unusual or unique situation, yet one in which a
more alert board may have caught signs of trouble. Does this mean
that the board should be personally liable for not catching what was
going on? John C. Whitehead, former non-management director and
audit committee chairman, testified that Enron showed signs that a
more alert or curious board should have noticed.243 Perhaps if the
audit committee and board failed to exercise a "normal" level of over-
sight they should be personally liable. But, on the other hand we do
not want to make it impossible to recruit qualified and willing board
members by increasing the financial and liability risks too much. Fur-
thermore, the reputational public stigma of having served on such a
board combined with the new SEC ability to place the former board
members on a list of people who can no longer serve on any public
board may be punishment enough for those members who did not
have actual or constructive knowledge of the fraud.
C. Disclosure
1. Economic Ties
As noted in the discussion regarding independence for board and
audit committee members, disclosure and independence can be highly
interrelated. The proposed tightened independence requirements re-
quire disclosure of all economic interrelationships, and board mem-
bers with any economic ties to the company are not allowed to serve
on the audit committee.2 44 As analyzed in Section VI.A.4. above, it
241. SEC Release No. 34-42266, supra note 28, included a release that audit committee re-
quirements are not meant to increase the audit committee's liability; the commentary implies
that the SEC implicitly recognizes the argument that under state corporate law the more in-
formed the audit committee becomes through its discussion with management and auditors, the
more likely that the "business judgment rule" will apply and provide broad protection." This
goes along with the discussion in this paper that adherence to a sound business process should
result in less, not more, exposure to liability.
242. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 61.
243. NYSE Statement, supra note 11, at A-133. See also Lubin, supra note 100, at C1.
244. NYSE 2002 Standards, supra note 37, § 303A1.
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remains to be seen if the new disclosure requirements regarding eco-
nomic ties will be sufficient for ensuring true independence.
2. Ordinary Business and Non-Ordinary Transactions Classified
In addition to disclosure requirements regarding director indepen-
dence, neither the current nor proposed disclosure requirements pro-
vide guidance to help the audit committee distinguish between
ordinary business and non-ordinary business transactions that must be
disclosed in a company's financial statements. For example, Enron
was able to pull off its infamous Special Purpose Entity ("SPE") trans-
actions because it managed to classify the transactions, despite unusu-
alness, outside of the form of transaction that was required to be
disclosed.245 Thus, although the existence of SPEs was disclosed, the
disclosure was inadequate to sufficiently inform investors as to the im-
plications of the transactions. 246
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation now requires disclosure
of all off balance-sheet SPE transactions, what happens when the next
ingenious invention of a new transaction type comes along? Some-
how the audit committee's oversight in conjunction with disclosure
rules should catch these types of complex transactions. Although the
resulting disclosure might still be necessarily imperfect due to the
complicated nature of the transactions, at least investors would be on
notice that something unusual was occurring.247 Although the suffi-
ciency of transactional disclosure is an issue the FASB and the SEC
must address, it seems like the exchanges should be able to do some-
thing, in conjunction with those other groups, in the meantime. Per-
haps the situation can be addressed by the SEC and FASB first
245. Harms & Rosen, supra note 126, at 16. Briefly, Enron had developed and/or purchased
SPEs that were 97% owned by Enron and 3% by an independent party; this 3% minority inter-
est ensured that Enron did not have to consolidate the SPEs for balance sheet purposes. Enron
then sold some of their assets to the SPEs in order to get them off Enron's balance sheet. In
return, the SPE paid Enron for the assets' fair market value ("FMV"), and Enron claimed a gain
of the difference between the FMV and its basis in the assets sold. The SPE financed the
purchase price of the assets by selling bonds to the public and borrowing from bank loans. How-
ever, the SPEs could only get the banks and bondholders to finance the required money if Enron
guaranteed it. So, Enron did a total rate of return SWAP with the SPE, covering the same
assets, and transaction where it had performed the sale of assets. Enron signed an agreement to
pay and guarantee all the interest and principle due on the borrowed money and SPEs paid
Enron any profits from the subsequent sale of the assets to outside parties. (Author's summary
of Enron situation.).
246. Steven L. Schwarcz, Duke Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 28: Some
Thoughts on the Enron Bankruptcy, at http://www.chron.com/content/news/photos/O2/O2/O3/en-
ron-powersreport.pdf.
247. Id. at 8 (suggesting that investors must rely on the board's business judgment to some
extent as they will not understand the full implications of exceedingly complex transactions).
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putting together a list of all transaction types that are ordinary in the
sense that they are straight-forward and transactions that the investing
public has knowledge about; transactions such as loans, bonds,
leasebacks. This list could be mobile in the sense that the SEC could
add new transactions to it as soon as they determined acceptable ac-
counting treatment for each new type of transaction. Next, the NYSE
could implement a listing requirement that all transactions not ap-
pearing on that list must be discussed with the audit committee and
disclosed in the company's annual report. Although this proposal
does not address a long-term solution for how to account for new
transactions at least it will result in public awareness of the fact that
something different or unique is going on. Furthermore, since such a
disclosure could have a negative impact on the stock price of a com-
pany - investors are wary about things they do not understand - this
type of listing requirement could also provide an incentive for compa-
nies to bring new types of transactions to the attention of the SEC so
that they can be added to the list as quickly as possible and thus no
longer require specific disclosure. 248
Various groups have proposed disclosure requirements that focus
on board principles rather than new procedures. For example, the
Business Roundtable cautions against regarding establishment of new
processes or procedures as a panacea, and instead recommends that
the focus be on setting forth broad principles of corporate governance
that will facilitate the sufficiency of disclosure.249 Although perhaps
not ideal long-term solutions, the process suggested above, or one of
that type of board principles requiring disclosure of all new transac-
tion types, would at least provide heightened disclosure to the invest-
ing public.
3. Disclosure Verse Oversight
Critics of the current disclosure system claim that it does not need
more financial disclosure rules, but stronger oversight of the rules. 250
Others, including the author, disagree with this statement and think
that a major cause of situations like Enron is the lack of investor
awareness of what was really going on; it seems that a mixture of
heightened disclosure requirements and stronger oversight is needed.
248. Note that the author is not suggesting that such a system will rid the process of fraud. As
discussed supra Section VII.D., if someone is determined enough to commit fraud they will al-
most always succeed for a time at least. The author is not suggesting that this type of system
would catch those non-fraudulent transactions that are not currently disclosed because they fall
outside the disclosure requirements, but that investors should be made aware of.
249. NYSE Statement, supra note 11, at A-24.
250. Id. at A-93.
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Although some of the problems at Enron were due to fraud and ille-
gal actions, the SPE transactions that took place were not necessarily
fraudulent or illegal in their composition. While stronger oversight
may have allowed the audit committee to catch the fraudulent and
illegal acts that were being perpetuated, stronger oversight alone
would not have stopped the entire situation.251 The SPE transactions
at issue were arguably, technically in compliance with accounting and
disclosure rules even if the purpose was fraudulent.252 Heightened
disclosure would have at least provided public awareness of these
transactions while greater oversight may not have stopped them.
D. Detection of Fraud
Since the beginning of time people have found ways of getting
around "the rules." Regardless of what rules, regulations or standards
are in place, if an individual really wants to effect a fraudulent transac-
tion it is difficult, if not impossible to stop them. Although the audit
committee can increase heightened disclosure and oversight as a
means of addressing detection of fraud, there are situations where
even the most stringent rules will not stop the perpetuation of
fraud. 253 The events of 2001 have shown that massive fraud is likely to
be detected, eventually. However, eventually is not the same as
immediately.
1. Enron and Disclosure
Enron's board of directors was what most experts would call
ideal.254 However, they either participated in, or did not discover,
massive fraud perpetuated by management. 255 First, the board waived
its own code of ethics to allow Enron to participate in deals with part-
251. Wachtell et al., Corporate Governance: Some Lessons from Enron, in CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 347 (Practicing Law Institute 2002).
252. William C. Powers, et al., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee
of the Board of Directors of Enron (THE POWERS REPORT) (Feb. 1, 2002); Powers Report,
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, at 307 (Practicing Law Institute
2002) (noting that the transactions were designed to accomplish favorable financial statement
results not to achieve any bona fide economic objective or transfer risk; and the SPE transac-
tions consisted of creative efforts to circumvent accounting principles through complex
structuring).
253. See Michael C. Sullivan & Darren K. Wald, Financial Reporting Restatements: What Are
the Causes and Warning Signs?, 2002 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 112 (2002) (for an analysis of why
rules will not stop fraud generally).
254. Lubin, supra note 100, at Cl.
255. The following discussion regarding the level and types of fraud in the Enron case was in
part developed from a lecture during an advanced reorganization class at Harvard Law School,
Spring 2003.
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nerships that were controlled by its own CFO. Although this waiver
was disclosed, experts felt it was not sufficiently questioned.2 56 The
"theft" that eventually occurred through the partnerships was later
estimated at almost $40 million. Here, board oversight and disclosure
of the deals failed to catch the fraud. The 2002 NYSE proposed listing
requirements and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will prohibit all business
transactions between related parties, require that the SPE off-balance
sheet transaction be disclosed, and will not allow corporate loans to
executives and directors. 257
Yet, there is never a 100% assurance that fraud could not take place
in a slightly different form. For example, Enron's CFO could have
had a friend, with whom he had no public relations or prior business
transactions with, run these partnerships so the CFO was not in-
volved, then paid the CFO on the side. Yes, such actions would be
illegal, involve an additional participant, and most likely eventually be
discovered. However, whether such a transaction would be approved
in the first place would depend in large part on the board's determina-
tion of the third parties "non-relatedness" in its oversight role. The
proposed requirements would make this type of fraud more difficult
to perpetuate, but it would still not necessarily be impossible.
The issue of financial fraud brings us back to the simple inquiry if
audit committees are asking the right questions to get to the heart of
what is going on in a company; it has been suggested that three ques-
tions every audit committee should ask in the wake of Enron are: (1)
what off balance sheet financing does the company do; (2) what re-
lated party transactions has the company engaged in; and (3) what
relationships exist between the independent audit firm and the com-
pany.258 These questions seem reasonable; they also seem rather ba-
sic. Thus, a better question to ask may be why audit committees were
not already asking these questions.
A second type of transaction that led to the bankruptcy of Enron
was through transactions with SPEs.259 Essentially Enron used two
perfectly legal transactions in combination to transact a sale of assets
in a way through which it could recognize the gain inherent in the fair
market value of appreciated assets, but also retained the risk of de-
fault inherent in bonds sold to finance the sale of those assets. The
256. Powers, supra note 252, at 24; NYSE Statement, supra note 11, at A-33; See generally The
Powers Report, supra note 252.
257. Securities & Exchange Commision, Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure about Crit-
ical Accounting Policies, Exchange Release No. 33-8040 (Dec. 12, 2001), modified January 16,
2002.
258. Keller, supra note 108.
259. Id. at 255.
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question remains, was this combination transaction fraudulent or ille-
gal? There seems to be no reason why they would have combined
these transactions except for fraudulent purposes. 260 Thus, in the
cases going forward the courts will have to decide if the purpose ren-
ders the combined transactions illegal. Assuming the transaction itself
is not illegal, the fact that it was not disclosed seems fraudulent. Yet,
although it seems like this transaction must have been done to fool the
market and some actor must have known, an inherent risk in this type
of situation is that most of the people involved probably never real-
ized they were doing something wrong and thus were not looking out
to stop any wrongdoing.
Part of the reason the SPE transactions were not flagged as high
risk, was that Enron's independent auditors signed off on the non-
disclosure of these transactions. This shows at minimum poor judg-
ment and at maximum, collusion. The auditors may have been influ-
enced to go along with Enron's transactions because of their lucrative
consulting contracts with Enron; if independent auditors are required
to spin off all other services, this part of the problem may be
avoided. 261 Yet, until this is required, of ongoing concern is ensuring
that the next generation of this type of transaction is also disclosed.
The responsible agencies and the new oversight board will have to
develop a stronger long term solution to combat the methods people
come up with to distort current disclosure rules.262
2. Detection of Fraud through Accountability
In addition, to the proposed NYSE listing requirements, the
Sarbanes-Oxley and Oversight board will implement new disclosure
procedures in an attempt to avoid the finger-pointing that goes on
between the board and the independent auditors whenever a problem
is uncovered.263 The SEC, Congress, and the self-regulatory agencies
have announced intentions to make significant changes in laws regu-
260. Harms & Rosen, supra note 126, at 43. See U.S. v. Simon, 425 F. 2d 296 (2d Cir. 1969)
(holding that" financial statements that fully comply with GAAP may nevertheless be fraudulent
under federal securities laws").
261. Harms & Rosen, supra note 126, at 43.
262. Id. at 42. Note that the 2002 NYSE proposed listing requirements contain the recom-
mended general disclosure requirement for expanded MD&A and critical accounting policies
disclosure in addition to the discussed audit committee requirement; however these are outside
the scope of this paper.
263. Under the Financial Accounting Standards Board and SEC pronouncements, manage-
ment, not the audit committee, is ultimately responsible for the financial statements while the
independent auditor is responsible for oversight. In the past this has led to much inter pointing
of the variety of the audits claiming "I did not know X was occurring because I was not told by
management"; and management responding "I did not know X was fraudulent because the audi-
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lating public companies' auditor oversight and company responsibil-
ity.264 The new rules attempt to get those parties who typically claim,
"I did not know." Chief Executive Officers (and perhaps CFOS) must
certify that they have put in place and reviewed the effectiveness of
required "disclosure controls and procedures" within 90 days before
an audit report is filed and that they presented the result of the review
to their auditors. In turn, the auditor must certify that management
has installed internal control procedures and must independently as-
sess them. Thus, in a sense the independent auditor is certifying that
managements' certification is correct; this should dissipate the "he
said she said" phenomenon and looking over each-others' shoulders.
Although the audit committee is not specially mentioned in this pro-
cess, it is indirectly implicated through its responsibility over selecting
and overseeing the independent auditor.
E. Initial Audit Committee Training and Continuing
Professional Education
From the beginning, people have recognized the importance of ori-
enting new members - it has been estimated that it takes at least a
year for new members to gain a working knowledge of organization's
financial reporting system and internal controls.2 65 Yet, the topics of
standardization of audit committee members training, or ongoing pro-
fessional educations are not addressed in the proposed listing require-
ments and industry experts feel that many committee members are
not receiving enough training at this time.266 Since it has been recog-
nized that ongoing training is one of the imperative factors for a suc-
cessful audit committee; this is a topic the Exchange should address
going forward. 267 Suggestions for topics that should be covered in ori-
entation and training include: the charter responsibilities, business and
industry insight, key risk for the company, key financial reporting, op-
erations and compliance controls, standard financial reports, key ac-
counting policies, statutory and regulatory requirements, reporting
and audit processes, earnings trends, support and resources, external
auditors, and committee self assessment and review.268
tor did not find anything wrong in the course of their audit." See, e.g., Berger & Cypers, supra
note 103, at 38-39.
264. Harms & Rosen, supra note 126, at 43.
265. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 31.
266. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17, at 63.
267. APOSTOLOU & JEFFORDS, supra note 4, at 34.
268. Id. at 43.
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F. Uniformity
The Institute of Internal Auditors has proposed that the NYSE,
AMEX and Nasdaq should jointly issue a uniform set of corporate
governance principles. 269 If uniform standards are developed they
may ease concerns about potential shortcomings of the audit commit-
tees for companies listed on various exchanges due to the perception
that expectations for audit committees may be unrealistic and that
there is a lack of available suitable committee members. 270 These
problems could be eased if each exchange's requirements are the
same since there will be no competition between them regarding ex-
pectations, and suitable candidates will have no reason to prefer serv-
ing on a committee whose company is listed on a certain exchange
verse a different exchange. However, other general concerns will not
be helped by uniformity, such as managements concern about lack of
representation on the committee.
Uniformity may not be required or beneficial for two reasons. First,
the fear that uniform rules will lead to a race to the bottom in the
sense that coordination will ensure there is no competition with "bet-
ter" standards that protect the investing public more so each one will
be less motivated to update and better its own standards. Second, a
brief comparison of the NYSE and NAS proposed listing requirement
shows that they are in fact relatively similar in most respects such that
requiring a transition to a uniform system could be a whole lot of
work for limited results.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As a representative of investors with simultaneous fiduciary duties
of loyalty and care to the company, the board as a whole must concur-
rently be independent from and answer to management. Thus, there
is an inherent conflict which can never be put to rest, but that might
be best taken care of with heightened disclosure and independence
requirements. The audit committee has a critical role within the
framework of corporate accountability since the jurisdiction of the
committee is to oversee and monitor the activities of the corporation's
financial reporting system, and the internal and external auditing
processes. As discussed above, it seems like the key to an effective
audit committee is the right mix of knowledge, judgment, indepen-
269. NYSE Statement, supra note 11, at A-82.
270, CICA, supra note 4, at 63; Olson, supra note 178, at 1102 (noting that good directors may
decline to take on audit committee service and those who do serve may face increased risk of
personal liability).
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dence, and commitment. 271 The above analysis details a critical look
at the 2002 proposed NYSE listing requirements and sets forth-addi-
tional alternative issues that could be investigated. In general, the
above analysis shows that although the proposed audit committee list-
ing requirements present a step in the right direction; eventually more
will be needed. A summary of the author's conclusions regarding
specific provisions and implications of the proposed listing require-
ments follows.
A. INDEPENDENCE
First, the expanded cooling-off period from three to five years is
likely to catch more non-independent relationships; yet, the SEC and
Exchanges should investigate if an even longer time period would be
more beneficial. Second, the requirement that each listed company
have a majority of independent directors is significant in that it should
help investors' confidence in the oversight process; but, since studies
show that most listed companies already meet or are close to meeting
this requirement, whether this requirement will actually affect change
in many boards' composition remains to be seen. Third, the author
thinks the Exchange's focus on defining types of relationships that
render directors non-independent rather than listing specific relation-
ships is a good method that provides adequate guidelines for compa-
nies and their expectations but also leaves room to incorporate new
types of relationships as necessary. Fourth, the Exchange should con-
sider examining each director's past relationships with other directors
as another possible area that may affect the autonomy and indepen-
dence of board and audit committee decisions. Finally, the Exchange
should further investigate the practicality and potential impact of
commentaries' suggestions that an alternative focus on changing dis-
closure requirements rather than independence rules could have a
stronger and more lasting impact on investor confidence.
B. Composition
Despite the decision by the Exchange not to update its financial
expert requirement, the "audit committee financial expert" require-
ment implemented under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will affect some
change in the composition of audit committees for listed companies.
This change seems positive and perhaps will make it easier for the
committees to recognize instances of financial fraud and misstate-
ments. Yet, the SEC and Exchange should make certain that the
271. STEINBERG & BROMILOW, supra note 17.
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movement to focus membership qualifications on quantitative back-
grounds and financial expertise does not eclipse the equally important
need for members who possess the more qualitative virtues of curios-
ity, skepticism, and diligence. Furthermore, the Exchange should
consider addressing additional composition topics such as: (1) the
length of audit committee service; (2) limiting the number of commit-
tees and boards an individual can simultaneously serve on; (3) dictat-
ing a minimum number of meetings the committee must hold each
year; (4) imposing staggered terms for committee members; and (5)
requiring an odd number of members. Finally, the exchange should
consider investigating the practicality of the offered alternatives and
more unique suggestions for enhancing the performance of the com-
mittee in a way that could bring back the emphasis on communication
skills, curiosity, and diligence as desired qualities.
C. Written Charter
Maintaining the requirement to have a written charter may seem
like the right decision. The debates surrounding this charter require-
ment center around how specific the scope and duties laid out in the
charter should be. The proposed listing requirements move towards a
much more specific delineation of required duties, responsibilities,
and purposes for the audit committee; it is possible that as the new
requirements are implemented we will see that they may in fact be too
specific. Yet in response to the commentary that the requirements are
too specific is the counter-claim that many of the new requirements
are in fact things that audit committees have unofficially been respon-
sible for, for years. Thus, another potential critique of the proposed
requirements is that they will not truly affect change in practice. The
applicable section of this paper presents a comparative discussion of
these views but time and implementation will tell which pans out.
With respect to some of the specific purposes, duties, and responsi-
bilities added: (1) granting the audit committee sole authority over the
hiring, firing, and other services performed by the independent audi-
tors should have a positive impact on the integrity of financial report-
ing; (2) with respect to the oversight purposes mentioned in the
charter, it seems as if the requirement is lacking in that there is no
enforcement mechanism included; (3) granting explicit authority for
the audit committee to obtain advice from outside experts as needed,
could positively increase their use of this previously available outlet;
(5) with respect to the audit committee's annual performance evalua-
tion, perhaps the Exchange should go further and specifically require
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the committee to present a formal evaluation of its own activities and
members' level of involvement to the board.
D. Fees
The proposed limitation on fees for audit committee members is good.
Yet, perhaps the Exchange should also consider further limiting the
independent auditors' fees received for the provisions of non-audit
services.
E. Rotation
Although the Exchange does not formally require rotation, listed
companies will have to adhere to state corporate law and SEC rules in
this area. Further, the Exchange should consider requiring mandatory
rotation of independent audit firms as an alternative to the SEC re-
quired rotation of lead and concurring audit partners. The Exchange
should also consider addressing the issue of the rotation of audit com-
mittee members, which has thus far been overlooked.
F. Other Issues the NYSE Should Investigate
Despite the many beneficial changes included in the proposed listing
requirements, there remain areas of concern, which the exchange has
failed to reach. To properly attain its goal of fostering investor confi-
dence in financial markets and providing clean and accurate financial
reports, the Exchange will need to consider: (1) the impact and incen-
tives from non-audit services on auditor and audit committee indepen-
dence, and in conjunction with auditor rotation and fees; (2) the
potential chilling effect of both stricter membership requirements and
more specific responsibilities, due to potential audit committee mem-
bers' fear of increased personal liability; (3) heightened disclosure re-
quirements for economic ties (i.e. including between members of an
audit committee), and for the classification of non-ordinary business
transactions the audit committee should be investigating; (4) rules for
heightened awareness of the importance of early detection of fraud;
(5) training and continuing education for audit committee members;
and (5) whether there should be more uniformity in the rules of the
various SROs.
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